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ABSTRACT
Intellectual property protection involves a trade-oﬀ between the undesirability of monopoly and
the desirable encouragement of creation and innovation. As the scale of the market increases, due
either to economic and population growth or to the expansion of trade through treaties such as the
World Trade Organization, this trade-oﬀ changes. We show that, generally speaking, the socially
optimal amount of protection decreases as the scale of the market increases. We also provide simple
empirical estimates of how much it should decrease.
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The U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power “To promote the Pro-
gress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discover-
ies.” This recognizes the two basic economic features of intellectual property
protection: On the one hand, exclusive rights create monopoly power and
so should be limited in time. On the other, monopoly power provides an
incentive for creation and innovation. For practical reasons the same time
limit applies across a wide variety of creations and innovations: In U.S. law,
copyright is life of author plus 70 years for individual works and 95 years
for works for hire. Design patents are 20 years, and ornamentation patents
are 14 years. Since the private proﬁtability of creating and innovating var-
ies widely, this means that for any ﬁxed time limit many ideas will earn
proﬁts above the level needed to recoup the cost of innovation. In a larger
market proﬁts will be greater, and inframarginal ideas will earn additional
economically unnecessary rents. Hence, as the market expands, it becomes
possible to reduce the length of term without reducing the production of
new ideas. But, as the market expands, some ideas that were not proﬁtable
to produce will become so, and reducing the length of term will discourage
these marginal entrepreneurs. Which of these two competing forces should
matter more for good policy?
In this paper we look at the general equilibrium interaction that determ-
ines how optimal protection varies with the scale of the market. Proﬁtability
of an innovation depends upon three factors: the initial cost of discovery,
the elasticity of demand, and, ﬁnally, the size of the market. All these
elements vary widely and unsystematically across innovations. We concen-
trate on market size for three reasons. Contrary to the other two factors,
market size is straightforward to measure. Secondly, growth in per capita
income and the expansion of international trade have increased market size
by two orders of magnitude since U.S. patent and copyright legislation was
introduced. Finally, the ongoing process of trade expansion has put the
international harmonization of intellectual property rights at center stage,
through the World Trade Organization’s agreement on trade-related aspects
of intellectual property rights (WTO-TRIPS).
Our basic result is an intuitive one. Optimal policy involves a tradeoﬀ
between increasing the monopolistic distortion on inframarginal ideas and
increasing the number of marginal ideas. As the scale of the market in-
creases, it will generally be desirable to give up some of the additional mar-
ginal ideas in exchange for reduction of monopoly across the broad variety of
inframarginal ideas that will be produced anyway, and so the optimal policy
should reduce the length of protection as the scale of the market increases.
We make this point in the context of a simple model, intentionally de-
signed to render intellectual property protection socially beneﬁcial. Ideas are
created subject to an indivisibility, or ﬁxed cost. There are many possible2
ideas, and to model the fact that each should have downward sloping de-
mand, we adopt the Dixit-Stiglitz model of preferences. The private return
on an idea is the ratio of expected monopoly revenue to its cost of creation.
We consider ﬁrst the case in which the private return has a neutral eﬀect
on the relationship between the private and social beneﬁto fa ni d e a . W e
show that the complex heterogeneous mass of ideas can be analyzed by ex-
amining the total monopoly revenue from all ideas with a private return
above a threshold level. Using this tool, we show that when the market is
suﬃciently small, it may be optimal to provide an unlimited monopoly, but
when the market is large enough, a time limit should always be imposed,
and this limit should strictly decrease as the size of the market grows.
This model is related to a series of papers by Grossman and Helpman
[1991, 1994, 1995] studying innovation in a Dixit-Stiglitz framework. It is
most closely related, however, to Grossman and Lai [2002, 2004]. Their
approach diﬀers from ours in two respects. First, where we use a static
analysis, they embed the static model in a dynamic setting by treating costs
and proﬁts as time-ﬂows. While this approach does not answer all dynamic
issues, such as the depletion of existing ideas and ideas that use other ideas
as inputs, it is a valid dynamic interpretation of the model we use. Since
Grossman and Lai have already provided this interpretation, we do not do
so here. Second, their model uses a production function approach to the
creation of new ideas. That is, ideas are of homogeneous quality and are
produced using a constant returns technology with human capital and labor
as inputs. Although this approach to the production of ideas is less versatile
than our disaggregated model of heterogeneous ideas, under the assumption
of symmetry it is possible to translate production functions into equivalent
total monopoly revenue functions, so in this case their model has the same
reduced form as ours, and we show how to make the connection.
The most signiﬁcant diﬀerence between our results and those of Grossman
a n dL a ia r et h a tt h e yf o c u so nt h ec a s ei nw h i c ht h ep r o d u c t i o nf u n c t i o ni s
Cobb-Douglas. Both they and we show that this means that optimal pro-
tection does not change with the size of the market. If, though, the total
monopoly revenue function has increasing elasticity, then optimal protec-
tion locally decreases and vice versa. The Cobb-Douglas case is then the
boundary between these two general cases. Although we also show, as noted
above, that when market size is large enough, optimal protection must al-
ways decrease–even in the Cobb-Douglas case–the question arises: Are
we currently in a region of the total monopoly revenue function where op-
timal protection might be constant or increasing? We give both theoretical
reasoning and empirical evidence that this is not the case.
Grossman and Lai focus also on “harmonization” and North-South trade.
Because they provide a detailed treatment, especially of issues involving who
beneﬁts from harmonization, we examine only the baseline case involving
multiple countries. Our goal is to show how–contrary to their ﬁnding–
in the empirically relevant case of increasing elasticity of total monopoly3
revenue, the North should reduce protection as a result of harmonization.
I nt h ec a s eo ft w oc o u n t r i e so fe q u a ls i z e ,b e c a u s es o m eo ft h eb e n e ﬁts of a
higher time limit are received by the other country there is a tendency to
set protection too low, and there is a “harmonization” argument to be made
for international treaties raising the time limit. However, this argument
applies only to countries of equal size. When the countries, two or more,
are of unequal size, the smaller country tends to set low limits and free
ride oﬀ the large country–but the large country tends to set limits that
are too high because it does not account for the social beneﬁt of innovation
to the smaller country. An implication of this result is that the process of
trade expansion should be accompanied by a parallel process of intellectual
property reduction. In this case “harmonization” does not mean setting
limits equal to or higher than those in the larger and more protected country,
but rather adjusting the time limits to lie in between the larger protection
o ft h el a r g e rc o u n t r ya n dt h es m a l l e rp r o t e c t i o no ft h es m a l l e rc o u n t r y .
The general equilibrium approach emphasizes the connection between
broader features of the economy and intellectual property. We illustrate
this through various comparative static results. Increasing the scale of the
market increases the demand for the specialized labor needed to create ideas.
For given intellectual property (IP) protection, this drives up the wages of
that kind of labor. These increased economic rents do not serve a useful
economic purpose, because they do not increase the number of ideas that
are produced; their only eﬀect is to redistribute income from the rest of the
economy to the subset of IP protected workers. We also consider a number
of extensions of the basic model. The most important is to relax the as-
sumption that quality is neutral in the relation between private and social
values of an idea. As either the scale of the market or the term of intel-
lectual property protection increases, ideas that are more marginal from a
private point of view are produced. If the social value of these ideas declines
even faster, then the argument for decreasing the length of protection with
market scale is strengthened. If ideas that are more marginal from a private
perspective are more beneﬁcial from a social perspective, then a system of
exclusive rights is a poor method of encouraging the production of valuable
ideas: it leads to the production of the least, rather than the most, socially
useful ideas. When legislation is in place that allocates monopoly power
to the producers of certain goods and not of others (patent and copyright
protection varies widely across economic sectors), a natural consequence is
the emergence of socially wasteful lobbying and rent-seeking activities. In
our framework rent-seeking would consist of payments going from producers
to legislators to increase the length of intellectual property protection. The
basic result is that the entrepreneurs who have access to the less marginal
projects are more willing to pay for the legal monopoly to be continued or
extended. Hence, in the presence of rent-seeking behavior, intellectual prop-
erty protection leads to an equilibrium in which its length is determined, at
the margin, by those innovators who need it the least.4
One may wonder why the relation between the size of the market and
the optimal level of IP protection (that is, the optimal degree of monopoly
p o w e r )i sn o te m p h a s i z e di nt h e“ n e w ”g r o w t hl i t e r a t u r e ,w h i c hh a sa ti t s
core a model of adoption of new commodities similar to the one used here.
We see two reasons: First, the question is never asked because that literature
assumes that monopoly power is good and necessary for innovation. Second,
because the impact of market size on the optimal length of IP protection
is buried behind the so-called size eﬀect, according to which increasing the
size of the market speeds up the growth process due to increasing returns.
So, for example, in the Romer [1990] paper on endogenous technological
change, one reads that (p. S95) “... these models have an underlying form
of increasing returns in research. As a result, an increase in a scale variable
induces an increase in the rate of growth.”
2. The Model
Ideas are indexed by their characteristics ω, which measure the cost and
utility of an idea and lie in Ω,ac o m p a c ts u b s e t 1 of <n.T ob ei n v e n t e d ,e a c h
idea requires a minimum amount h(ω) ≥ 0 of the only primary input, labor,
where h(ω) is a measurable function. We refer to h(ω) as the indivisibility,
minimum size, or ﬁxed cost for producing a new idea. The “number” of
ideas with given characteristics in an economy of unit size is a positive
measure η(ω). We will later focus on the case where η(ω) is a probability
distribution, and innovators ﬁnd their individual ideas by drawing from this
underlying distribution, but this interpretation is not essential. Allowing
n u m e r o u si d e a sw i t ht h es a m ec h a r a c t e r i s t i c si su s e f u lb e c a u s ei tm a k e si t
easy to think about the possibility that doubling the size of an economy
might double the number of ideas of given cost and utility.
There is a continuum population of size λ of agents; with λ we measure
the scale of the economy. The number of available ideas may depend on
the size of the economy, so the total number of ideas with characteristics ω
a v a i l a b l ei na ne c o n o m yo fs i z eλ is g(λ)η(ω). To capture the principle that
in a larger population more ideas of a given quality are available, g(λ) is
assumed nondecreasing in λ; we may assume without loss of generality that
g(1) = 1.I nt h ec a s ei nw h i c hη(ω) is a probability distribution from which
innovators draw their ideas without replacement, twice as many innovators
means twice as many ideas with given characteristics, so g(λ)=λ.N e i t h e r
that the number of ideas increases with size at diﬀerent rates for diﬀerent
characteristics nor that the indivisibility varies with the size of the economy
is a possibility considered here.
We assume initially that once an idea is created, it may be reproduced at
no cost and without limit. If the input of labor y(ω) used in producing ω is
below the threshold, that is, y(ω) <h (ω), no prototype will emerge and no
1A c t u a l l y ,a n yt o p o l o g i c a lm e a s u r es p a c ew i l ld o .5
consumption is possible. If y(ω) ≥ h(ω), then consumption is x(ω) ≥ 0.I t
is convenient also to measure consumption per capita as z(ω)=x(ω)/λ.
The utility of ideas is uncertain at the time the invention decision is
made.2 I no u rm o d e l ,t h i sm e a n st h a ti ti st h ee x p e c t e dr e t u r no na ni d e a
ex ante, and not the ex post determination of whether the idea turns out
to be a good one or a bad one, that matters for the decision to invent. For
concreteness, we may imagine that z u n i t so fa ni d e aw i t hc h a r a c t e r i s t i c sω
has utility to a representative consumer of u(z,ω) ≥ 0 with probability p(ω),
while with probability 1 − p(ω) the idea has no utility at all.3 Normalize
u(0,ω)=0 , and assume that p(ω),u(z,ω) are continuous in ω with the
latter also continuous and nondecreasing in z and, at least up to a limit
Z(ω), smooth and strictly increasing.
Set v(z,ω)=p(ω)u(z,ω) to be expected utility. We assume limz→∞
v(z,ω)=vC(ω) < ∞.S i n c ev(z,ω) is bounded, zvz(z,ω) → 0 as z →∞ ;
that is, per capita revenue falls to zero as per capita consumption grows
without bound. We also assume that zvz(z,ω) has a unique maximum at
zM(ω).
The utility of a representative individual has a Dixit-Stiglitz form over
goods of diﬀerent characteristics. Apart from consumption of idea-goods,
consumers receive utility from time   spent on activities that take place
outside of the idea sector. If L is the individual endowment of time, 0 ≤
  ≤ L.S i n c eg(λ)η(ω) of type ω ideas are potentially available, individual
utility is Z
v(z(ω),ω)g(λ)η(dω)+ .
Note that the marginal utility of time outside the idea sector is normalized to
one. We will consider later the possibility that this marginal utility changes
with the scale of the economy; for example, increases in per capita GDP
may increase the productivity of labor outside the idea sector. The social
feasibility constraint is that the amount of time spent outside the idea sector
equals the amount left over after the production of ideas
λ(L −  )=
Z
y(ω)g(λ)η(dω).
Proﬁt maximization and eﬃciency require y(ω)=h(ω) for all ideas for which
x(ω) > 0,a n dy(ω)=0 , otherwise. It is also obvious that no good would
be produced in this economy absent patent protection; we look later at the
less extreme case in which a capacity constraint exists and making copies
involves a positive marginal cost.
2The cost might be uncertain as well, and in a dynamic setting it may also be possible
to develop an idea gradually, choosing to stop if the idea turns out to be a poor one. We
abstract from these diﬃculties.
3Other functional forms can be accommodated; more general distributional assump-
tions add notational complexity, with little substantive implications for our model or
results.6
Patent Equilibrium. Our notion of equilibrium is that of a patent equi-
librium in which there is a ﬁx e dc o m m o nl e n g t ho fp a t e n tp r o t e c t i o nf o ra l l
ideas. This means that, in terms of present value of the ﬂow of consumption,
af r a c t i o n0 ≤ φ ≤ 1 occurs under monopoly, and a fraction (1−φ) occurs un-
der competition; hence, φ is the level or the extent of protection. Potentially,
many individuals can invent any particular idea; certainly the number of in-
dividuals who have historically had truly unique ideas is minuscule. We do
not model the “patent race” by which patent is awarded, and simply assume
that, for each of the η(ω) ideas with characteristics ω, a particular individual
is awarded a “patent.” While the patent lasts, the inventor is a monopolist,
and our economy is similar to the traditional Dixit-Stiglitz “monopolistic
competition” economy. Once a patent expires, anyone who wishes to do so
may make copies of ideas that had been previously introduced under the
patent regime. Once competition sets in, output and consumption jump to
inﬁnity while prices and revenue fall to zero.4 A type of good is produced
if, given the patent length φ, the prospective monopolist ﬁnds it proﬁtable
to overcome the indivisibility. This notion of equilibrium is closely connec-
ted to that of Hart [1979] and Makowski [1980], and it has been used, for
example, by Acemoglu and Zilibotti [1996] in a related context.
The market for innovation is equilibrated through the wage rate of labor
w.. The higher is w, the costlier it is to produce new ideas, and fewer of them
will therefore be produced. If the amount of labor used in the production of
i d e a si ss t r i c t l yl e s st h a nt h et o t a le n d o w m e n tλL,w a g e sw =1 .O t h e r w i s e ,
w must be chosen to reduce demand for labor to the point where the amount
of leisure is 0.
A monopolist who holds a patent for a good with characteristics ω and
sells z units of output to each of the λ consumers receives revenue λz(ω)vz
(z(ω),ω), which is assumed to have a unique maximum at zM(ω),a n d
pays the cost wh(ω). For a commodity with characteristics ω, ρ(ω)=
zM(ω)vz(zM(ω),ω)/h(ω) expresses the ratio of (per capita) private value
to the innovation cost. In fact, ρ(ω)/w represents one plus the rate of re-
turn on investment which would accrue to the inventor of commodity ω if
patents lasted forever and the market size was λ =1 .W er e f e rt oρ(ω) as
the private return for ω. The monopolist receives a fraction φ of the private
return, times the size λ of the market. Hence, a good is produced if
ρ(ω) ≥ w/φλ ≡ ρ.
In other words, no ideas with private return lower than ρ will be introduced
in the patent equilibrium, and all ideas with a ρ(ω) above ρ will be produced.
Notice that ρ is strictly decreasing in φλ, meaning that as the scale of the
market or the extent of protection increases, ideas with a lower private
return are introduced. Notice also that, in general, there need not be any
4W ea s s u m er e v e n u ef a l l st oz e r oa sq u a n t i t yg o e st oi n ﬁnity for the sake of simplicity;
as pointed out in Boldrin and Levine [1999], it need not be the case, and the inventor will
earn positive competitive rents even after the patent expires.7
monotone relation between the private return ρ(ω) of an idea and its social
return; hence, ideas of high social return may be introduced only for high
values of λ, or even never at all, if their private return ρ(ω) is particularly
low.
Per capita social welfare in a patent equilibrium is derived by integrating
utility for those goods that are produced less the cost of producing them
Z
ρ(ω)≥ρ
[φv(zM(ω),ω)+( 1− φ)vC(ω) − h(ω)/λ]g(λ)η(dω)+L.





so that the amount of labor required to produce all ideas exceeding any
particular private value threshold is ﬁnite.
Notice that ρ(ω)h(ω)η(ω) is the total revenue of a monopolist investing
in goods with characteristics ω in an economy of unit size. For any given





Then M (ρ) is the sum of monopoly revenue over all ideas with private value
of ρ, or greater. We assume that M is diﬀerentiable and deﬁne the elasticity
of total monopoly revenue, with respect to variations in the marginal idea,
as Υ(ρ) ≡− ρM0(ρ)/M(ρ) > 0. We also make the regularity assumption
that Υ(ρ) is diﬀerentiable.
Let νM(ω) ≡ v(zM(ω),ω)/[h(ω)ρ(ω)] and νC(ω) ≡ vC(ω)/[h(ω)ρ(ω)] be
the ratio of social value to private return of a commodity of type ω under
monopoly and under competition, respectively. To ﬁx ideas, consider the
case in which utility has the quadratic form
v(ω,z)=b(ω)
¡
Z(ω)2 − [z − Z(ω)]2¢
for z ≤ Z(ω) and v(ω,z)=b(ω)Z(ω)2 for z>Z (ω).T h e nw eh a v eνM(ω)=
3/2 and νC(ω)=2independently of characteristics. More generally, we
can deﬁne the notion of return neutrality. If the ratios of social values to
private return νM(ω) and νC(ω) are both constant, we have strong return
neutrality. Formally, observe that the measure h(ω)η(ω) represents, in an
economy of unit size, the quantity of labor needed to produce all ideas
with characteristics ω.. Consider the measure h(ω)η(ω),r e s t r i c t e dt ot h eσ-
subalgebra of the Borel sets of Ω generated by the subsets of Ω on which ρ(ω)
is constant; make the regularity assumption that it can be represented by
a continuous density function µ(ρ)=
R
ρ(ω)=ρ h(ω)η(dω). For any function,
f(ω),d e ﬁne a conditional value f(ρ) in much the same way as a conditional





B f(ω)h(ω)η(dω) for every set B in the8
σ-subalgebra of the Borel sets of Ω on which ρ(ω) is constant. By return
neutrality we mean that νM(ρ),νC(ρ) are constant.5 Below, we consider
ﬁrst the neutral then the nonneutral case.
3. Return Neutrality
We ﬁrst examine the case of return neutrality and ask how socially optimal
protection ˆ φ(λ) depends on market size. We ﬁnd that, if the elasticity of
total monopoly revenue is well-behaved near ρ =0 , then for large enough
λ socially optimal protection must be declining with λ. Further, if the
elasticity of total monopoly revenue is increasing with ρ, a condition that,
contra Grossman and Lai [2002, 2004], we argue is likely to be the case, then
socially optimal protection is in fact decreasing as a function of λ.
Basically, there are two cases. If the elasticity of total monopoly revenue is
increasing with ρ and ˆ φ(λ) < 1, we can show from the ﬁrst-order conditions
and implicit function theorem that ˆ φ(λ) is strictly decreasing. If, instead,
the elasticity of total monopoly revenue is decreasing with ρ,t h e nl a b o r
demand is growing faster than labor supply, and so the labor constraint
must eventually bind. We show that whenever the labor constraint binds,
it must be the case that ˆ φ(λ) is strictly decreasing.
Proposition. Suppose return neutrality. If for some ˜ ρ and 0 <ρ<˜ ρ,
Υ0(ρ) 6=0 ,t h e nt h e r ee x i s t sλ such that ˆ φ(λ) is unique and strictly decreasing
for λ>λ.I fˆ φ(λ) < 1,t h e nΥ0(1/λb φ(λ)) > 0 implies ˆ φ(λ) is unique and
strictly decreasing; Υ0(ρ)=0in a neighborhood of 1/λb φ(λ) implies ˆ φ(λ) is
unique and locally constant, and Υ0(1/λb φ(λ)) < 0 and ˆ φ(λ) unique6 implies
ˆ φ(λ) is strictly increasing.
Proof. Use return neutrality to rewrite social welfare as
Z
ρ0≥ρ
[φνMρ0 +(1− φ)νCρ0 − 1/λ]g(λ)µ(ρ0)dρ0 + L.
We begin by analyzing the case in which the labor constraint does not bind,
so w =1 .D i ﬀerentiating with respect to φ and dividing out the constant
5By assuming all ideas are identical from the point of view of consumers, Grossman
and Lai [2004] implicitly assume strong return neutrality.
6In this case we cannot guarantee that the second-order condition is satisﬁed, so we
must allow the possibility that ˆ φ(λ) has multiple values, and that for such values of λ the
function ˆ φ(λ) decreases.9





















− (νC − νM)M(1/φλ).





φνM +( 1− φ)νCª
− 1
¤
Υ(1/λφ) − (νC − νM)
has the same qualitative properties as FOC(λ,φ):i th a st h es a m ez e r o e s
and the same sign on the boundary, and NOCφ(λ,φ) < 0 is suﬃcient for a
z e r ot ob eal o c a lm a x i m u m .
We next diﬀerentiate with respect to φ to ﬁnd the second-order condition













The second term is unambiguously negative. The ﬁrst term has two factors
of interest. We have (1/φ)
©
φνM +(1− φ)νCª
−1 representing social surplus
of the marginal idea produced; since privately it yields zero proﬁt, it must
yield positive social surplus. If the other factor Υ0(1/λφ) > 0, then there
is a unique solution to the social optimization problem; if NOC(λ,1) ≥ 0,
then that solution is ˆ φ(λ)=1 ; otherwise, it is the unique solution to the
ﬁrst-order condition NOC(λ,φ)=0 .















which has the opposite sign to Υ0(1/λφ). This covers the second half of the
proposition when the labor constraint does not bind.
If the labor constraint does bind, increasing φ only increases the wage
rate. Hence, if the social optimum is to allow the labor constraint to bind,
φ must be chosen as small as possible subject to the constraint of full labor
utilization and w =1 . Consequently, concavity of welfare in the interior
implies a unique optimal choice of φ. This establishes a unique optimal
policy function ˆ φ(λ) when Υ0(1/λb φ(λ)) ≥ 0.
Finally, we turn to the ﬁrst half of the proposition. For ﬁxed φ and all
large enough λ, we can assume that either Υ0(1/λφ) > 0 or Υ0(1/λφ) < 0.10
In either case, Υ(ρ) must have a (possibly inﬁnite) limit as ρ → 0.O b s e r v e
that Υ(ρ) ≡− ρM0(ρ)/M(ρ) and that M(ρ) is nonincreasing. Suppose ﬁrst
that −ρM0(ρ) does not converge to inﬁnity. If it is bounded away from
zero, M(ρ) →∞ , implying Υ(0) = 0. If it is not bounded away from zero,
since M(ρ) is bounded away from zero, again, Υ(0) = 0. Hence, either






Υ(1/λ) − (νC − νM).
Since Υ(0) = 0 for λ suﬃciently large NOC(λ,1) < 0, implying ˆ φ(λ) < 1. It
now follows from the ﬁrst part of the proof that ˆ φ(λ) is strictly decreasing.










Labor supply is λL,s oi fDλLD ≥ L+  for all suﬃciently large λ,t h el a b o r
constraint must eventually bind. But −ρM0(ρ)=ρ2µ(ρ) →∞as ρ → 0.
So, for φ bounded away from zero, DλLD →∞ . Hence, in this case the
labor constraint must bind.
Three Implications. Theorists of innovation and growth due to aggregate
increasing returns often insist that the latter are due to massive externalities
in the creation of new ideas. In our framework this requires g(λ)/λ to be
increasing in λ; that is, the number of available ideas increases more rap-
idly than the scale of the economy. This leads to a number of extravagant
predictions, which we will compare to the empirical evidence later. Here it
suﬃces to remark that, as a matter of theory, g(λ)/λ increasing in λ implies
that the labor constraint must bind eventually; when it does the private re-
turn from the marginal idea adopted increases rather than decreases. While
this does not imply that ideas with a higher social value will be produced,
it certainly does imply that the optimal length of protection φ is strictly
decreasing in λ.
That intellectual property protection can drive up the wage rate for the
relevant supply of highly skilled labor is empirically relevant for policy. Lob-
byist groups, especially in the entertainment and pharmaceutical industries,
often point to the high cost of producing new goods as a reason for strong
IP protection. Examination of the balance sheets of either movie production
or pharmaceutical companies shows that much of this high cost is due to
the earnings of the “highly skilled” labor these, and other IP protected in-
dustries, employ. Consider the entertainment industry: costs are high here
because a few“stars” earn large amounts of money. Since the opportunity11
cost of these people is generally quite small, an important eﬀect of redu-
cing copyright protection will simply be to lower the rents earned by these
“stars,” and consequently to reduce the cost of producing movies of a given
quality. In such industries, the marginal workers are paid close to their
opportunity cost and so stand to lose little through reduced copyright pro-
tection. A similar, even if admittedly less straightforward, argument can be
applied to the drug industry with respect to the wages of medical researchers
in relation to that of production workers.
Other, comparative static results also follow from the previous analysis.
Any policy or technological change increasing the marginal cost of the skilled
labor needed to introduce new ideas is equivalent to decreasing λ,s og e n -
erally such changes increase the socially optimal length of protection. This
observation is relevant when confronting policies that increase the protec-
tion of selected groups of skilled workers from foreign labor competition
(for example, by restricting immigration or penalizing outsourcing); in this
case, protection in the labor market induces additional IP protection and
rent-seeking in the product market. Conversely, technological improvements
(such as the increasing power and reduced cost of computers or the recon-
struction of the DNA code) which reduce the size of the initial indivisibility
h are tantamount to increasing λ; hence, they should engender a reduction
of the socially optimal length of protection.
The Production Function Approach. By way of contrast, Grossman
and Lai [2002, 2004] adopt a production function approach where ideas are
homogeneous and the total number of ideas is Q = F(H,L), where H is a
ﬁx e da m o u n to fh u m a nc a p i t a l ,L is the labor input, and F is a constant
returns to scale concave production function. Since human capital serves
in this model only to absorb the rents from ideas, we may as well write
Q = f(L), where f is a diminishing returns production function. While
we do not think that ideas are like automobiles–more or less perfect sub-
stitutes stamped oﬀ a production line–we can construct a total monopoly
revenue schedule corresponding to Grossman and Lai’s production function
and by doing so give an interpretation of their assumption in our frame-
work. Observe that when w =1the total labor cost of producing Q ideas
is f−1(Q), and the corresponding marginal cost is 1/f0(L). Since all ideas
are equally valuable, we may as well suppose they generate revenue 1, so
in our terminology, the private return of the idea produced by the Lth unit
of labor input is revenue divided by the cost of producing the idea; that is,
ρ = f0(L). The total revenue to ideas with private return ρ or better is then
the total number of ideas produced by the corresponding amount of labor
M(ρ)=f([f0]−1(ρ)).
>From this we can easily derive that the elasticity Υ of M is the same as
Grossman and Lai’s elasticity of research output with respect to labor.7 In
7In their notation, this elasticity is γ.12
the Cobb-Douglas case, which is the benchmark case studied by Grossman
and Lai, f(L)=Lα, and so M(ρ)=αα/(1−α)ρ−α/(1−α), which is to say
that M has constant elasticity. Also of interest is their CES case, where












For β<0, M(ρ) is deﬁned for ρ ≤ 1,w i t hM(1) = 0,a n de l a s t i c i t yi s
increasing in ρ.T h ec a s e0 <β≤ 1 implies that even with no labor input,
a1/β ideas will be produced. This is not ridiculous: even in the absence of
any eﬀort, some ideas with a positive return may be discovered by accident.
Also in this case M(ρ) is deﬁned for ρ>1 with M(1) = ∞, that is, the
revenue generated by ideas goes to inﬁnity, even before all ideas of positive
quality are exhausted. Here we have decreasing elasticity.
4. The Elasticity of Total Monopoly Revenue
The question then is, Which assumption is most appropriate on the elasti-
city of the total monopoly revenue function? We address it here from both a
theoretical and an empirical perspective. First we look at distributions that
are interesting either because they satisfy intuitive properties or because
they allow for explicit computations and are widely used in practical ex-
amples. With the exception of the Pareto, we ﬁnd that the elasticity of M(ρ)
is increasing. Next we look at empirical distributions of income/revenue for
diﬀerent kinds of inventive activity and ﬁnd that they exhibit rapidly rising
elasticity. Finally, we derive the implications of the constant elasticity as-
sumption for the equilibrium demand of labor in the idea sector, as the scale
of the market increases. We show that assumptions of constant or decreas-
ing elasticity is grossly at odds with any available data, and probably also
with common sense.






might look like. Under the plausible assumption that there are ideas so
bad that they have a negative private return, we expect µ(0) to be strictly
positive, and ﬁnite. This implies that M(0) is ﬁnite, and M0(0) = 0,s o
limρ→0 Υ(ρ)=0 .S i n c e Υ(ρ) ≥ 0,t h i sm e a n sΥ0(0) ≥ 0, that is, the
increasing elasticity case. In other words, theoretical considerations alone
suggest that the function M(ρ) is ﬁnite and ﬂat at ρ =0and has increasing
elasticity there. We should not expect situations such as that implied by
the CES production function for 0 <β≤ 1 in which elasticity is globally
decreasing, or even constant.13
4.1.1. The Pareto Distribution. If µ(ρ) is Pareto, then M(ρ)=ρ−ζ,w h i c h
corresponds, up to a scale factor, to the functional form implied by the Cobb-
Douglas production function. Since the Pareto density goes to inﬁnity for
ﬁnite ρ, as we have observed, this is not a terribly good global model of the
distribution of ideas, and we would not expect it to hold for ρ close to zero.
Nevertheless, it can certainly be argued that we are still in the upper tail
of the distribution of quality of ideas. And there is certainly a great deal of
economic data that appears to have Pareto upper tails, so it is possible in
principle that we are still experiencing values of ρ for which Υ0(ρ) ≤ 0.O r ,
perhaps, the tails are even thicker than Pareto, with a lump of ideas with
zero cost, as is the case for the CES production function with 0 <β≤ 1.
This is an empirical issue, and we will address it shortly.
Next we quickly run through various functional forms for µ(ρ) that might
be useful to model the distribution of ideas and see what they imply for
M(ρ) and Υ(ρ).
4.1.2. The Exponential, Normal, and Lognormal Distributions. Consider ﬁrst
the Exponential, where µ(ρ)=ζ3e−ζρ.T h e nM(ρ)=ζ(ζρ+1 ) e−ζρ and
Υ(ρ)=( ζρ)2/(1 + ζρ),
which is increasing in ρ. For the Normal distribution, say µ(ρ)=e−ζρ2
,w e
have that M(ρ)=( 2 ζ)−1e−ζρ2
and Υ(ρ)=2 ζρ2, which is also increasing
for all values of ρ>0. Similar calculations yield equivalent results for a
Lognormal distribution of private returns. Should we restrict ourselves, as
it is reasonable, to positive and large values of ρ, the results do not change, in
fact, they are strengthened. For the Normal distribution, Υ(ρ) is increasing
in ρ over the whole interval (0,∞), constant at ρ =0 , and decreasing for
negative values of ρ. For the Exponential, Υ(ρ) is increasing for all ρ>0
and for ρ<−2/ζ as well.
4.1.3. The Truncated Pareto Distribution. In principle, a Pareto distribu-
tion with a ﬁnite upper bound is appealing, and it allows for explicit compu-
tations. It amounts to assuming that private returns are distributed Pareto
and there is an idea of highest possible quality, so µ(ρ)=ρ−ζ for ρ ≤ ρ,a n d
µ(ρ)=0for ρ>ρ,w i t hζ<2. (But notice that for values of ζ<0 this says
that the frequency of ideas increases with their quality, and then suddenly
drops to zero after the maximum value ρ is reached, which does not make
much practical sense, so assume ζ>0.) In this case, again, elasticity rather

























− (νC − νM)=0 .
We rewrite the NOC as
λρ(νC − νM)φ2 + φ − νC =0
and then ﬁnd the positive root
φ =
p
1+4 λρ(νC − νM)νC − 1
2λρ(νC − νM)
.







which implies an elasticity of protection with respect to scale of market of
1/2. That is, quadrupling the scale of the market implies that protection
should be reduced by about a factor of two.





Υ(1/λ) − (νC − νM).
If λ>1/ρ holds, that is, the size of the economy is large enough, then
NOC(λ,1) < 0, implying an interior solution. This shows that the size
of the economy and the upper bound on the achievable private return on
ideas play a similar role in our model; a small economy where very highly
proﬁtable ideas are available is equivalent, from the viewpoint of optimal
protection, to a large one in which only not-so-proﬁtable ideas are available.
Now, let ρλ ≤ 1 hold, so that NOC(λ,1) > 0,s oφ =1is optimal. This
is an economy either of very small size or in which the private return from
new ideas is very low. In this case even complete monopoly cannot help:
with φ =1the marginal idea produced is ρ =1 /λ, implying that ρ ≥ ρ
holds, that is, no idea is ever implemented.








while labor supply is LS = Lλ. Suppose the labor constraint is binding;
equilibrium is achieved either by lowering labor demand through the wage
rate or through the protection level φ. We know social optimality requires
keeping the wage rate at 1 and equilibrating the labor market using the










which, once again, is strictly decreasing in λ and ρ.15
4.2. Empirical Analysis of Total Monopoly Revenue. Up until now
we have been thinking of ideas as empty boxes to be ﬁlled in by individuals.
From an empirical perspective, it is more useful to think of each individual
being associated with her own ideas, that is, to think of ω as indexing
individuals or, rather, individuals’ private return from investing in ideas.
Then h(ω) becomes equal to the cost of person ω’s time, or if labor is equally
productive in the nonidea sector, h(ω) would be the same for all individuals.
This is a strong, but not incredible, assumption that is more or less the
opposite of the production function approach; we will adopt it to start with
and consider its weaknesses later. That is, set h(ω)=1 ; then, any individual
with an idea of expected value higher than 1 would try to implement it. We
then identify individuals with their private returns ρ and think of them as
equivalent to the expected value of their ideas, with the latter being drawn
from an underlying distribution µ(ρ) satisfying the restrictions discussed
earlier. We are interested in the shape of µ(ρ) as this would allow us to
compute the elasticity of M(ρ) at the “cutoﬀ idea-individual” ρ =1 /φλ.
An issue arises when going to the data. In our model, v(ω,z)=p(ω)u
(ω,z),w h e r e1−p(ω) is the probability that ex post, after the project is paid
for, the idea turns out to have no value. Unfortunately, we rarely, if ever,
observe the price vz(ω,z)=p(ω)uz(ω,z), but rather just uz(ω,z).A sl o n g
as p(ω) does not depend on ω, this means that we will overestimate returns
and revenues, but will correctly ﬁnd elasticities. So we must assume not only
that h(ω) is constant, but p(ω) is as well. We have also assumed that there
is only one “successful” ex post outcome; if there is a large variation in ex
post outcomes, this too will pose a problem for data analysis. Movie revenue
data, for example, would pose a huge problem in this regard, because of the
high degree of ex ante uncertainty about how much a given ﬁlm is likely to
earn.
4.2.1. Personal Income Distribution. Our ﬁrst attempt uses data for the
U.S. income distribution. That is, we make the further assumption that
the distribution of income among creative individuals is the same as for the
population at large. This is probably incorrect when it comes to levels:
creative individuals are likely to be concentrated in the upper tail of the
distribution of personal income. However, it is a plausible assumption about
the shape of the distribution of income from creative activity. In any case, to
the extent that the largest share of personal income is due to labor eﬀort and
people use their creativity in accumulating skills and choosing an occupation,
this is a reasonable starting point. Current Population Survey data on
income from 2001 are shown in Table 1. Abusing notation slightly, let ρ
denote personal income here; the corresponding M(ρ) is plotted in Figure
1.16
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Sophisticated econometric and statistical knowledge is not required to
see that this curve is well ﬁt by a straight line and poorly by a Pareto
distribution. The U.S. cumulative distribution of personal income, clearly,
has increasing elasticity.
4.2.2. Revenue from Authorship of Fiction Books. We now examine a par-
ticular category of creative individuals: authors of ﬁction books. Ideally,
one would like to observe revenues for various books for each author, to
account for the possible ex ante uncertainty about ex post sales. Such data
are not available; hence, we proceed with what is. Although we do not
have data on lifetime income of individual authors, we do have data on the
revenue generated by individual book sales. Looking directly at revenues
from book sales is interesting because, as noticed, authors may earn above
a v e r a g ei n c o m e ,a n di n d e e dm a yb el a r g e l yi nt h eu p p e rt a i lo ft h ei n c o m e
distribution–which is not measured at all by the income data we reported
earlier. It might well be that while the bulk of the distribution of personal
income is linear, it is Pareto in the upper tail, and the income of authors
might turn out to be distributed like the upper tail of overall personal in-
come. Assuming h(ω) constant in this case means that all those that “give
it a try” at writing ﬁction have equivalent opportunity costs. We ignore the
problem of initially deciding to be an author and focus on the decision to
continue writing books after the ﬁrst. For new authors, there is an option
value to producing the ﬁrst book–since if it is a failure, there is no reason
to continue as an author. Our static model does not capture this type of
option value. But if we assume that the cost of writing the ﬁrst book is
small relative to the lifetime cost of being an author, this will not matter
much. We also ignore the fact that it is costly to produce books once they
are written, which is largely irrelevant to our ends to the extent that the
cost of producing each copy of a book is independent of the number of copies
produced and sold. Suppose the following:
• All authors take the same amount of time to produce a novel and
have the same opportunity cost, so h(ω) is constant.
• Authors earn all their income from the sale of their novels.17
• Expected revenues from the sale of a “successful” book are perfectly
anticipated, and the probability of failure does not depend upon ω.
Then income per unit of time taken to produce a book is r = λφρ and,
given current copyright laws, one can safely set φ =1in what follows. We
can compute the aggregate income of all authors who earn at least a given
amount, Mr(r), and of course M(ρ)=( 1 /λ)Mr(ρ/λ) has the same elasticity.
We gathered data on revenues for 1223 and 1235 ﬁction books published in
September 2003 and September 2004, respectively. Figure 2 shows M(ρ)
for September 2003. Figure 3 shows a plot on logarithmic axes, including a
c l o s e u pt oi l l u s t r a t em o r ec l e a r l yt h ei n c r e a s i n gn a t u r eo ft h ee l a s t i c i t yo n
both ordinary and logarithmic axes. Figure 4 shows the September 2004
data.
Examining these plots, four things stand out.
First, the graphs are very similar both in shape and absolute values.
This suggests that (i) the pattern reported here is quite robust, and (ii)
even for successful books most sales take place in the ﬁrst few months after
publication.8
Second, for less successful books the M(ρ) function is nearly linear, and
overall the function exhibits increasing elasticity–a fact that can be seen
more clearly in the logarithmic plots.
The third striking feature is the discontinuity between roughly $150,000
and $300,000 in revenue.9 This is most pronounced in 2004, where 5 books
out of 1235 generate nearly 25% of the revenue.10 These books appear to
be predominately by “big name” authors,11 who are largely irrelevant for
optimal copyright policy: the relevant part of the M(ρ) function is the part
near the cutoﬀ–that is, for marginal, not inframarginal, books.
The fourth is how low the indivisibility wh(ρ) may be for writing and pub-
lishing ﬁction; in 2003, 1181 books, out of a total of 1223, earned $50,000
or less (corresponding to total revenue of approximately $300,000). These
books accounted for 50% of total revenue, that is, $6M out of $12M. The
numbers for 2004 are similar. In the September 2003 data, 984 books earned
less than $10,000; hence, our estimate of the marginal author’s opportun-
ity cost wh(ρ) should be placed at $60,000 or less. In light of our earlier
discussion, such a conclusion is valid only if those authors and their pub-
lishers, correctly predicted actual sales. Certainly books earning $300,000
8Data for the months of March 2003 and March 2004 conﬁrm this is indeed the case.
9The sales data are from a single distributor, Ingram, constituting about 1/6 of the
book market, so total revenues would be about six times this number.
10This is broadly consistent with other data on books revenues: Leibowitz and Margolis
[2003] report that less than 200 out of 25,000 titles account for roughly 2/3 of all book
revenues. This is considerably more concentrated than we ﬁnd in our data–but certainly
reﬂects a strong discontinuity.
11Of the ﬁve books earning above $300,000 in 2003, three are by authors with previous
best-sellers, one by a well-established author who had not previously been on the New
York Times best-seller list, and one was by a ﬁrst-time author.18
in revenue are paying the opportunity costs of the authors, and it is hard to
imagine that 1235 books were published during September 2004 hoping to
be one of the 5 that generate more than $300,000 in revenue.
What are the implications of these data for the optimal φ,a n dh o wd o e s
this compare to actual copyright protection? Since the Sonny Bono copy-
right extension act of 1998, copyright protection in the United States is life of
the author plus 70 years, or 90 years for works without an author. If we take
the remaining life of an author to be roughly 35 years, this would mean 105
years of protection.12 If the ﬂow of sales is constant over time, for interest
rate r and copyright length T, the corresponding value of φ =1−e−rT.T h e








Since no reasonable estimate of the real interest rate is below 0.2, this
means that the current φ is fairly close to 1. Moreover, the ﬂow of sales is
far from uniform over time; in our data for books published in September
2003, during the four months of 2003 revenues were 2.4 times the revenue
during the 10 months of 2004, meaning that per month sales fell by a factor
of 6. This is consistent with the general claim that the most signiﬁcant book
sales occur within three months of publication.13
The elasticity Υ(ρ) of M(ρ) for the 2003 data is shown in Figure 5. From












In the case of linear demand, νC =2 ,νM =3 /2.. Table 3 reports the
corresponding lengths of optimal copyright for various real interest rates
and elasticities in the range in Figure 5.
12Akerloﬀ et al. [2002] use an estimate of 30 additional years of life and a 7% real
interest rate.
13Our ﬁndings are somewhat diﬀerent from those of Leibowitz and Margolis [2003],
who argue that for popular books, revenues are somewhat more spread out over time. In
our data, the top 9 books (those above the discontinuity) earned 3.3 times more revenue
in 2003 as in 2004. This has the implication that eﬀective protection is slightly greater
for inframarginal books than marginal books–exactly the opposite of what is socially
desirable.19
Table 3
Υ ˆ φ r =0 .2 r =0 .4
0.05 0.13 7 4
0.10 0.24 14 7
0.15 0.33 20 10
0.20 0.40 26 13
0.30 0.51 36 18
0.40 0.60 46 23
Two facts stand out. First, optimal length of protection is less than 1–
meaning that given the elasticity is increasing, optimal copyright protection
should decline with the size of the market. Second, optimal copyright length
is much less than actual copyright length; since the actual cutoﬀ value of ρ
in the data is quite small, even an elasticity of 0.05 may be a tremendous
overestimate of the actual elasticity on the margin. Certainly it is hard
to justify even 7 years of copyright based on these data. This evidence
argues quite strongly that copyright protection is determined by rent-seeking
and not as an optimal policy: the only real beneﬁciaries from copyright
extensions that increase the eﬀe c t i v ep r o t e c t i o nf r o m ,s a y ,0 . 9 8t o0 . 9 9a r e
not potential authors, but holders of current copyrights that are about to
expire. Transferring money to existing copyright holders, of course, serves
no useful economic purpose.
4.2.3. Patent Values. A similar analysis of the value of patents is possible–
with the reservation that it is less likely for patents that ex post value can
be anticipated ex ante. However, it may be that the major uncertainty in
patenting is not how much will be earned if the project is successful, but
rather, how likely the patent is to succeed, in which case our model applies.
If we disaggregate by industry, it is at least plausible that the ﬁxed cost of
the innovation is not systematically related to the ex post private return.
We use ex post data on the value of patents from Lanjouw [1993] for four
German industries–estimated from patent renewal rates and data on the
cost of renewal. We graph the corresponding M(ρ)curves in Figure 6.
We compute the elasticities of the linear spline at the midpoint of the
intervals in Table 4.
Table 4
Computers Pharmaceuticals Textiles Engines
..22 [.17] .14 [.12] .19 [.15] .32 [.23]
..74 [.40] .53 [.33] .66 [.38] .95 [.45]
..93 [.30] .75 [.30] .88 [.31] 1.12 [.32]
3.76 [.60] 2.35 [.48] 2.42 [.44] 3.04 [.42]
2.73 [.12] 2.81 [.16] 3.02 [.14] 3.37 [.12]20
A sc a nb es e e n ,i nn oc a s ea r et h et a i l ss i m i l a rt ot h a to faP a r e t o
distribution–the curves fall far too close to zero. Moreover, with the (ir-
relevant) exception of the highest category of ρ for computers, they exhibit
increasing elasticity over every portion of their range. Table 4 also reports in
square brackets −ρM0(ρ).T h i si sr e l e v a n tb e c a u s et h es a m eφ (i.e., 20 years)
applies across sectors. Hence, the relevant distribution is M(ρ)=
P
i Mi(ρ),
where i indexes the various industries subject to patenting. Unfortunately,
t h ef a c tt h a te a c hMi(ρ) function has increasing elasticity does not im-
ply that this is true in the aggregate. Hence, it is of interest to examine
−ρM0
i(ρ). If this is increasing, then the corresponding elasticity is increas-
ing as well, and increasing −ρM0
i(ρ) is a condition that does aggregate.
While not increasing in (virtually) every case as is the elasticity, −ρM0
i(ρ)
is increasing at the lower end (near the existing threshold) and increases in
most cases. This means that these results can be expected to aggregate over
the diﬀerent industries.
One thing that should be clear about this analysis is that existing data are
not ideally suited to examining the M(ρ) function. In particular, estimate
of the anticipated and unanticipated components of return, and of the ﬁxed
cost h(ω),w o u l dg r e a t l yi m p r o v et h ea n a l y s i s .
Our ﬁndings for patents appear to accord well with existing, and more
elaborate, literature on the same subject. To name but a few recent studies,
Harhoﬀ, Scherer, and Vopel [1997] use a data set of full-term patents applied
f o ri n1 9 7 7a n dh e l db yW e s tG e r m a na n dU . S .r e s i d e n t s .T h e yc o m p a r et h e
performances of various empirical distributions, including Pareto’s, to ﬁtt h e
data and ﬁnd that a two-parameter log normal distribution provides the best
ﬁt. Silverberg and Verspagen [2004] use a variety of data sources (European
and U.S. Patent Oﬃces, as well as a data set on CT scanners) and diﬀerent
measures of ρ (citations and monetary values) in their estimation. They ﬁnd
that, while the overall distributions are well approximated by exponential
ones, it is the upper tail that is better captured by a Pareto distribution.
As our concern here is with the shape of the µ(ρ) near the lower cutoﬀ
value ρ, this is supportive of our claim. The older literature on the value of
patents, stemming from the path-breaking paper of Pakes [1986] (see Hall,
Jaﬀe, and Tratjenberg [2004] for a recent update and new results), seems to
ﬁnd, almost always that the appropriate distribution is a log normal or an
exponential, for both of which the elasticity of the total revenue function is
increasing. Interestingly, Sampat and Ziedonis [2002] ﬁnd that citations are
not a good predictor of revenues earned from licensed patents.
As in the case of copyright, the elasticities we observe argue that, if de-
mand is linear, optimal protection ˆ φ should be considerably less than one,
implying in addition that optimal protection should decline with the scale
of the market. Ignoring the fact that patents are likely to generate consider-
ably more revenue early in their life than late in their life, and referring back
to Table 3, the middle ground elasticity of .15 and a real interest rate of 4%
imply an optimal patent length of 10 years, while at the high end with an21
elasticity of .4 and a real interest rate of 2%, the optimal term would be 46
years. The existing U.S. term of 20 years lies in between. We believe that
the higher interest rate and lower elasticity are more reasonable. When we
combine this with the fact that an idea generates most revenue early in its
life, it suggests to us that current patent terms are too long. However, the
situation is clearly not as extreme as in the case of copyright.
4.2.4. Analysis of Labor Demand: Theory. Another route to determining
whether elasticity is increasing or decreasing is to study its implications for




µ(ρ)dρ = g(λ) (1/φλ).
Letting El denote the elasticity operator, its elasticity is
Elλ[LD(λ)] = Elλ[g(λ)] − Elρ[ (ρ)].
Depending on which assumptions one makes about g(λ),t h eﬁrst factor
ranges from zero to any large positive number. For example, Grossman
and Lai [2004] identify g(λ) with aggregate human capital H in their model
and assume this is constant relative to market size; hence, Elλ[g(λ)] = 0.
A sp o i n t e do u ti nS e c t i o n3 ,i nm o d e l so fg r o w t ha n di n n o v a t i o nd u et o
externalities, such as Grossman and Helpman [1991, 1994, 1995], or Romer
[1990], g(λ) increases faster than λ;h e n c e ,Elλ[g(λ)] > 1. A benchmark
case is that in which each individual draws her own ideas from the same
urn, with or without replacement. If sampling is without replacement, and
each person draws the same number of ideas for each characteristic ω,t h e n
g(λ)=λ and Elλ[g(λ) ]=1 ; if sampling is with replacement then, in general,
we would have Elλ[g(λ)] ≤ 1.





Now, assume that M(ρ)=ρ−ζ, which is the constant elasticity case. Then
 (ρ)=
(ζ +1 ) ( ρ)−1−ζ
ζ +2
,
and if El(g(λ)) ≥ 1,
El(LD(λ)) = El(g(λ)) + ζ +1 .
Notice that, when El(g(λ)) > 1, the elasticity of labor demand is predicted
to be substantially larger than two, or the elasticity of per capita labor
demand is greater than one. This implies that in the data we should observe
that, as the size of the economy grows, the share of workers in the idea
sector grows more than proportionally. This prediction is reinforced when
the elasticity of the total monopoly revenue function is decreasing, as we
show next.22
Proposition. Consider two aggregate monopoly revenue functions M1,M 2
that have the same value M1(ρ)=M2(ρ) and derivative DM1(ρ)=DM2(ρ)
(hence, elasticity Υ1(ρ)=Υ2(ρ))a tρ.I f DΥ1(ρ0) <D Υ2(ρ0) for ρ0 ≥ ρ.
Then
(1) Labor demand associated to M1 is smaller than the one associated







(2) The elasticity of labor demand associated to M1 is greater than the
elasticity of labor demand from M2;t h a ti s ,El[ 1(ρ)] >E l [ 2(ρ)].
(3) As the elasticity of total revenue goes from increasing, to constant,
to decreasing, the elasticity of the associated labor demand functions
increase monotonically.
Proof. Step 1: M1(ρ0) >M 2(ρ0).







so D2M2(ρ)−D2M1(ρ)=( M(ρ)/ρ)[DΥ1(ρ)−DΥ2(ρ)] < 0, where M(ρ) is
the common value of M1 and M2 at ρ. Then, for ρ0 near ρ we have
M1(ρ0) − M2(ρ0) ≈ (1/2)[D2M1(ρ) − D2M2(ρ)](ρ0 − ρ)2 > 0.
Moreover, if M1(ρ00) − M2(ρ00) < 0 for some larger ρ00,t h e nM1(ρ0)−
M2(ρ0)=0for some ρ00 >ρ 0 >ρ , since both functions are continuous.
Let ˆ ρ0 be the smallest such ρ0,t h a ti s ,t h eﬁrst point to the right of ρ where
M1 and M2 cross. Then Υ(ˆ ρ0)=−ρ0DM(ˆ ρ0)/M(ˆ ρ0) and the assumption
that Υ1(ˆ ρ0) < Υ2(ˆ ρ0) imply DM1(ˆ ρ0) >D M 2(ˆ ρ0);t h a ti s ,M1 crosses M2




























[M1(ρ0) − M2(ρ0)]/(ρ0)2dρ0 < 0.23
Step 3: El[ 1(ρ)] >E l [ 2(ρ)].
Because










El[ 1(ρ)] and El[ 2(ρ)] have the same numerator, and, because of Step 2,
the ﬁrst has a smaller denominator. Hence, the conclusion.
In plain words: if a constant elasticity revenue function implies an elasti-
city of labor supply with respect to market size larger than one, then a rev-
enue function with decreasing elasticity would imply an even larger elasticity
of labor supply. Playing this backward: should the empirical elasticity of
per capita labor supply with respect to changes in market size be smaller
than one, then the associated total revenue function would have to have in-
creasing elasticity, which is our claim. It is important to stress that, on the
b a s i so ft h ea l g e b r aa b o v e ,e v e ni fp e rc a p i t al a b o ri nt h ei d e as e c t o rg r o w s
faster than the scale of market, this is consistent with increasing elasticity
of total monopoly revenue. If per capita labor grows more slowly, we can
rule out decreasing elasticity, but not the other way around. This is because
Elλ[g(λ)] can be large, which is independent of the elasticity of monopoly
revenue.
Common sense is probably enough to reject the hypothesis that the elasti-
city of the total revenue function is constant or decreasing, as the latter
implies that when the market size doubles the share of population dedic-
ated to creative activity more than doubles. During the last century, the
eﬀective size of the world market has increased, roughly, by a factor of 100.
This implies that, at least in the United States, by now everybody should
be working in the idea sector, which, alas, we have not yet achieved.
4.2.5. Analysis of Labor Demand: Copyright. With this background, let us
look at some data. First we consider the copyright time series.14 Here we
must assume that the distribution M(ρ) is time invariant–for example, it is
not the case that all good ideas have been used up. We also must assume that
φ is either constant or increasing over time–as, in fact, it is. We measure
t h es c a l eo ft h em a r k e tb yt h es i z eo ft h el i t e r a t ep o p u l a t i o n , 15 and the
amount of labor in the sector by the number of copyright registrations. The
relevant annual growth rates for the United States are reported, by decade,
in Figure 7. If elasticity of total monopoly revenue is, in fact, constant
or decreasing, we expect to see per capita copyright growing more rapidly
14The data sources are described in detail in the Appendix.
15The literacy adjustment makes little diﬀerence; in 1870, when the copyright registra-
tion data begin, the literacy rate is already 80%, climbing to 92.3% by 1910.24
than population. This is, in fact, the case prior to 1900, and after 1970.
This means that, for those periods, we cannot rule out the possibility that
elasticity was constant or decreasing. For the pre-1900 period one must
notice that copyright registration only begins in 1870, so the huge initial
increase in registrations is unlikely to reﬂect a corresponding increase in
the actual output of literary works. In particular, it is important to realize
that in 1891 it became possible for foreign authors to get U.S. copyrights
for the ﬁrst time.16 Similarly, in 1972 it became possible for the ﬁrst time
to copyright musical recordings other than phonograph records–previously,
such recordings were protected under other parts of the law. In 2000 6.8%
of new copyrights were for sound recordings, so it is not so surprising that
copyright registrations jumped up in 1972. In 1976, the term of copyright,
which had been 28 years plus a renewal term of 28 years since 1909, was
increased to the life of the author plus 50 years. In 1988 the United States
eliminated the requirement of registering a copyright, so after that time,
there is no reason to think of copyright registrations as a particularly good
measure of the output of literary works. What all this means is that we
should focus on the period between the major Copyright Acts of 1909 and
1972. Here we ﬁnd that overall the literate population grew by 92%, while
the number of copyright registrations grew by only 12%. Moreover, the
literate population grew faster than the per capita copyright registrations
in every decade, although in 1920—30 and 1960—70 the two growth rates are
very similar. This is especially dramatic, because as we noted above, there
was considerable technological change during the period, with entire new
areas such as movies, recorded music, radio, and television opening up: by
2000 only 48% of new copyright registrations were for literary works–while
in 1909 literary works accounted for the bulk of copyright registrations.
Further, while the number of copyright registrations in the United States
overestimates the share of the U.S. per capita labor dedicated to literary
work, the size of the literate population grossly underestimates t h es i z eo f
the relevant market. The ﬁrst is because a large number of foreign writers
register their work in the United States, the second because the growth
in the U.S. per capita income and, especially, the expansion of “American
culture” around the world, greatly increased the potential market size.
The growth in per capita copyright is very low during the 70 years of
stable legislation, suggesting this may be due to a binding constraint, rather
than a gradual movement up the M(ρ) curve. The labor constraint bind-
ing seems implausible in this context, there being, as far as we can tell, an
essentially unlimited supply of mediocre want-to-be authors. Our model,
however, implies an essentially unlimited demand for diﬀerent books, while
in fact the average reader may become satiated after reading, say, 50 books
in a given year. We consider below the theory when there is satiation after a
16A brief history of U.S. copyright can be found at U.S. Copyright Oﬃce [2001a]. The
1972 change is described in U.S. Copyright Oﬃce [2001b].25
certain number of ideas have been consumed. The implication is essentially
the same as the labor constraint binding. Increasing protection beyond the
minimum required to reach the satiation point enriches authors, while inef-
ﬁciently leading to underconsumption of good books and overconsumption
of mediocre ones.
4.2.6. Analysis of Labor Demand: Patent Time Series. We next turn to the
demand for labor used to produce patentable ideas. One issue that arises is
whether we should measure the scale of market λ by population or by GDP.
Increases in per capita GDP increase the scale of the market, but they
increase the opportunity cost of labor in the nonidea sector (working with
existing ideas) by the same proportion, so have no impact on the eﬀective
scale of the market. On the other hand, increased productivity in the non-
idea sector may also be reﬂected in increased productivity in the idea sector:
double the per capita income may mean twice as many ideas. We will focus
on population as a more conservative measure of λ in time series data,
where per capita GDP is increasing. In the cross section we will examine
both population and GDP as measures of scale of market.
Figure 8 is the patent analog of Figure 7, and is quite similar. Whether
we measure patentable activity by patents awarded or patent applications,
from 1890 to 1980 the growth rate of per capita patents exceeds the growth
rate of population in only two decades, 1900—1910 and 1960—1970, and in
both cases by only a trivial amount. In other decades, the growth rate of
patents per capita is much lower than population growth, in some cases
even negative. Overall, from 1890 to 1980 population grew at a rate of 1.4%
per year, and per capita patents at 0.1% per year. Before 1890 patents
per capita grew considerably faster than population, with a large drop in
patents from 1860 to 1870 most likely because the reform of the patent law
and patent oﬃce in 1861 made it considerably more diﬃcult to get a patent.
In the opposite direction, in the period after 1980 it became much easier
to get and enforce a patent–the landmark event in this period being the
formation of a special court to try patent cases in 1982. Needless to say,
this court captured by patent attorneys has proven extremely hospitable to
upholding questionable patents.
As the reader will recall, our empirical discussion is predicated on the
assumption that h(ω)=1 , a constant across ideas and time periods. While
this is not so unreasonable for copyright data–a book taking roughly the
same amount of labor input in 1909 as in 1972–labor input required to
produce a patentable idea varies greatly both between diﬀerent patents at
a moment of time and over time. There is a vigorous debate over how to
appropriately measure labor input into the production of patentable ideas.
An alternative to measuring either patent applications or awards is to try to
directly measure research and development expenditure. R&D expenditure,
while in principle a better measure of input than patents, has a number of its
own problems. First, the concept of R&D expenditure is itself fairly fuzzy26
and available only for relatively recent years–the major source of data being
a National Science Foundation survey conducted since 1953. The deﬁnition
used by the NSF is “creative work undertaken on a systematic basis in order
to increase the stock of knowledge, including knowledge of man, culture and
society, and the use of this stock of knowledge to devise new applications.”
Firms and government agencies are surveyed and asked to report how much
t h e ys p e n do nt h i sa c t i v i t y .
The picture of R&D expenditure as measured by the NSF is radically
diﬀerent from that of the number of patents. Measured R&D expendit-
ure excluding the federal government as a fraction of GDP roughly tripled
between 1953 and 2002, and never grew by less than 14% in any decade.
During this same time period population growth never exceeded 1.7% and
real GDP growth averaged 3.2%. These data are discussed in Jones [2004].
Hence, if the NSF’s measure of R&D expenditure by the private sector is an
accurate measure of labor devoted to marketable ideas per capita, labor per
capita devoted to innovation grew vastly more quickly than any measure of
the scale of the market. Several comments are in order:
• Over time (even more so across countries) the tax treatment of activ-
ities regarded as R&D have changed. For example, the United States
began a tax credit for R&D expenditure in 1981. It is easy to imagine
that ﬁrms might wish to reclassify activities they had not previously
regarded as R&D in response to tax incentives.
• The very notion of “R&D” as a special activity is recent. At one time
these activities would have been called “entrepreneurship”–and it
is far from clear if they would have satisﬁed the NSF deﬁnition of
R&D. The amount of “formal” R&D conducted in laboratories by
individuals with educational credentials has undoubtedly been in-
creasing at the expense of “informal” R&D conducted by less edu-
cated individuals in homes, workshops, and shop ﬂoors. We wonder,
for example, if the time spent by Jobs and Wozniak building the
ﬁrst Apple computer in their garage is included in NSF measured
R&D for that year. If only the “formal” R&D is reported to the
NSF this would lead to a substantial overstatement of the rate of
growth of resources devoted to overall R&D. Note, however, that
small individual inventors may be likely to patent small innovations
so that they can sell them, while large ﬁrms may not patent small
innovations that they plan to use internally. If organized research
by large ﬁrms is supplanting that by small individual inventors, then
this would have the eﬀect that growth in “formal” R&D expenditure
overstates the growth in actual R&D labor input, while the growth
in patents per capita understates it.
• Dismissing the previous two “accounting” interpretations of the
growth in R&D opens the door to a huge puzzle as to why when27
resources per capita devoted to R&D grew at roughly 15% a year,
patents per capita grew practically not at all.
• Total R&D, including the federally funded R&D, grew rapidly in the
initial decade17–presumably as the Cold War got under way–and
has remained relatively static since then, with declining federally
funded R&D being replaced by private R&D. In 1958, for example,
R&D per GDP is 0.23, while in the trough of 1994 it is 0.24 and
peaks in 2002 at 0.278, which is slightly lower than its value in 1963,
0.284. If the propensity to patent from federally funded research
were similar to that from privately funded research, there would be
no patent puzzle. On the other hand, if the ratio of patents to
R&D has remained relatively constant, then in the period prior to
1940, where there was little or no federal funding of research, our
evidence above shows that per capita resources devoted to R&D
were not growing as fast as the scale of the market. If we accept
this view, then it is also possible that federally funded R&D was
primarily displacing privately funded R&D–perhaps because the
relevant labor constraint was binding–in which case private R&D
was growing not because of the increased scale of the market, but
because the federal government was reducing support for R&D.
• The growth of R&D expenditure will overestimate the growth in the
demand for R&D labor if the cost of specialized labor grows faster
than per capita GDP. This happens to be the case, and dramatically
so. That the real wages of “stars” employed in all kinds of copyright-
able productions have increased spectacularly faster than nominal
GDP needs not be documented. The substantial raise of the wage
premium for college graduates is also very well-known; between 1963
and 2002 the mean real wage of male college graduates has grown
64% while that of male high school graduates has grown about 31%.
What is less well-known, but well documented (see Eckstein and
Nagypal [2004]) is that the growth in the post-college premium was
even more dramatic; during the same time interval the mean real
wage of males with either a Master’s or Ph.D. degree grew by more
than 120%. Between 1963 and 2002, the period for which data are
available, the ratio between nonfederal R&D expenditure and GDP
goes from 0.095% to 0.20%, that is, it slightly more than doubles.
During the same period, the ratio between the real wage of males
with a post-college degree and the mean (median) real wage of males
has increased 40% (65%). What this means is that, if one makes the
reasonable assumption that the cost of labor employed in R&D grows
like the wage of workers with a post-college degree, then the estim-
ated share of actual workers employed in R&D over the total has
17Federally funded R&D per GDP increased by a factor of roughly 2.5 in that decade,
and is 66% of total R&D expenditure in 1963.28
grown roughly 50% during those 40 years, instead of tripling. While
this number still cannot reject the hypothesis that the elasticity of
total monopoly revenue is constant or decreasing, it is suddenly more
consistent with the opposite one, i.e., that it is increasing.
4.2.7. Analysis of Labor Demand: R&D Cross-Section. Finally, we look at
a cross section of countries. Here we run a simple regression with R&D
as a fraction of GDP as the dependent variable and market size and the
strength of IP protection as explanatory variables. There is an index of the
strength of IPRs constructed by Walter Park.18 We initially assume that the
domestic market is what is signiﬁcant. If   represents per capita labor eﬀort
in the ideas sector and we assume constant elasticity, then log  = ϑlogφλ.
There is considerable evidence in the data the increases in per capita GDP
positively inﬂuence the scale of the market. So we take λ = γαπ, where π
is population and γ is per capita GDP. Ordinary least squares regression
gives19 ϑ =0 .20(0.03), αϑ = .56(0.038), meaning also that α =2 .9,a
remarkably large number.20
As can be seen, the elasticity with respect to λ is nowhere close to unity.
However, this assumes that the relevant market for R&D is the domestic
market. More generally, we would measure λ = λdomestic + λworld,w h e r e
λworld is the fraction of world GDP available as a market for domestic R&D.
Since regressing log R&D on λ gives essentially the same result as regressing
on λdomestic/λaverage and regressing on log(λdomestic+λworld) gives essentially
the same result as regressing on λdomestic/λworld, the regression coeﬃcient
should be multiplied by λworld/λaverage. Thus, if the ratio of revenue earned
on R&D in foreign markets to domestic markets is on the order of 5, it is
possible that the elasticity of per capita R&D with respect to size of market
is near unitary. However, this ratio is implausibly large. Since world GDP
is on the order of $20,586 billion, the potential size of the world market is
much larger than 5 times the GDP of even the largest country. However,
this grossly overstates the relevant size of the world market. Exports are a
fraction, not a multiple, of GDP. Consequently, a ratio of 5 would be pos-
sible only if R&D is much more intensive in export industries than domestic
industries–by a factor of considerably more than 5. Using Lo’s [2003] de-
tailed data from Taiwan, in 1991 export-intensive industries spent about 1.8
times as much on R&D as domestic-oriented industries. Using microdata on
18We are grateful to Walter Park for providing us with his data. Details of the con-
struction can be found in Park and Lippholdt [2003].
19Standard errors in parentheses.
20The underlying data include 34 countries in the period 1980—97. The R
2 for the
regression is 0.65. There is no strong reason to think that φ is a linear function of the
index of IP protection, which is computed as a score based on various legal criteria.
However, if this measure of logφ is included as a separate variable, the change in the
estimates of ϑ,α is modest, while the t-statistic for the coeﬃcient of logφ is 1.711 and the
corresponding increase in R
2 is only 0.008. The data on which these results are based can
be found at http://www.dklevine.com/data.htm.29
renewal rates to estimate the value of patents, Lanjouw, Pakes, and Putnam
[1998] ﬁnd the highest value of the “implicit subsidy from patenting abroad”
at 35% for the United Kingdom and Germany, with most countries receiving
15—20% of income from a patent from rights held abroad. So the evidence
hardly supports the idea that λworld/λaverage is on the order of 5.
4.2.8. Conclusion on the Elasticity of Total Monopoly Revenue. We examine
a variety of data from diﬀerent sources, ranging from book revenues to patent
values estimated by renewal rates to R&D expenditures. We look at both
cross-sectional and time-series data. Each individual analysis has many
caveats–and this is clearly an area with a high rate of return to careful
empirical work. In the case of copyright, we think that evidence in favor
of increasing elasticity of total monopoly revenue is fairly decisive: all of
the diﬀerent sources of data say the same thing. In the case of patents, the
evidence is less conclusive and far more subject to measurement problems,
although we think it likely that the elasticity of total monopoly revenue
is increasing in this case as well. In both cases, our best guess as to the
functional form for M(ρ) would be that it is approximately linear in the
relevant range.
5. Extensions
5.1. Variations on the Utility Function. We assume that utility is linear

















In our examination of copyright time series we found reason to suspect
that the lack of growth in per capita copyright is due to a limit in the per
capita demand for books. The empirically relevant model is one in which
U(·) displays, after a point, sharply decreasing marginal utility. To see how
this works, consider the limit case in which U = u for u ≤ u,a n dt h e n
U(u)=u for u>u; continue to assume V is linear all thorough its domain.
As long as λ is small, u will be small enough that satiation cannot occur,
and the price of output in the idea sector is P =1 .O n c e λ grows, the
satiation constraint eventually binds. Equilibrium requires that exactly u
be produced in the idea sector, so the price in the idea sector falls to P<1
to discourage labor from ﬂowing into that sector. This is the mirror image
of the labor constraint binding.
More general nonlinearities in U and V have a similar eﬀect. As the size
o ft h em a r k e tg r o w sa n dm o r ei d e a sa r ep r o d u c e d ,t h ep r i c ei nt h ei d e as e c t o r
U0 declines for ﬁxed φ, and the marginal utility of labor in the other sector30
V 0 increases as labor moves to the idea sector and the relative price of labor
goes up. In general it is still best to exploit the opportunity oﬀered by an
increase in the size of the market by reducing φ, rather than by allowing the
relative price of skilled labor to rise.
5.2. Return Nonneutrality. So far we have focused on return neutrality.
Note that, as a function of private return under monopoly, social value under
monopoly is νM(ρ)ρ while social value under competition is νC(ρ)ρ so that,
for given φ, expected social value is ρ[φνM(ρ)+(1−φ)νC(ρ)].T h et w op o l a r
cases in which private return and social values are, respectively, positively
and negatively related are worth considering.
If goods with lower private return also have lower social value, in the
sense that DνM(ρ) > 0 or DνC(ρ) > 0,o rb o t h ,c o m m o ns e n s ea n ds i m p l e
calculations show that this is a further reason for the length of protection to
decline with the scale of the market. On the other hand, if DνM(ρ) < 0 or
DνC(ρ) < 0, or both, then this weakens the connection between the scale of
the market and the declining optimal protection. In particular, in this case,
it becomes possible to have the optimal degree of IP protection increasing
with market scale, even when the elasticity of total monopoly revenue is
increasing, so that the labor constraint never binds.
On the other hand, while DνM(ρ) < 0, DνC(ρ) < 0 may seem to rein-
force the case for increasing IP protection; in fact, it weakens it. That is,
DνM(ρ) < 0, DνC(ρ) < 0 means that private return is poorly correlated
with public beneﬁt. In the extreme case, there may actually be a negat-
ive correlation between private and public beneﬁt. In this case, the private
sector produces the ideas of least social merit ﬁrst. When the market is
small, IP protection results only in the production of ideas of little social
value, so scarcely makes sense. The argument for strengthening protection
as the scale of the market increases is that the increased scale of the mar-
ket eventually leads the private sector to produce ideas that do have some
signiﬁcant social value, and at this point, we can try to compensate for the
weakness of private incentives by increasing the level of protection. While
this is formally correct, it clearly is a lopsided argument when it comes to
designing welfare-improving policies. It takes as given the policy instrument
and patents, even if the latter is the least adequate to maximize social wel-
fare. If it were really the case in practice that privately valuable innovations
have little or no social value, and vice versa, then a form of government
intervention other than IP would be sensible, such as publicly sponsored
research projects, or auctioning of production rights, or subsidies for innov-
ators producing the socially valuable ideas, for example. Patents, certainly
not.
Alternatives to Government Grants of Monopoly. The latter remarks, that
when private and social values of new ideas are not aligned, IP protection
is the least appropriate policy instrument, suggest we should, albeit brieﬂy,31
consider how alternative forms of government intervention fare in our en-
vironment. An obvious alternative to having the government award private
monopolies is to have the government award prizes for innovation. This can
be ﬁnanced in much the same way that private monopolies raise money–by
imposing a sales tax on sales of new goods. Unlike the award of a private
monopoly, the tax rate does not need to be set so high as to give the mono-
poly revenue, and Gilbert and Shapiro [1990] show in eﬀect that having a low
tax throughout the life of the good is preferable to having a high tax (mono-
p o l y )f o rp a r to ft h el i f eo fag o o da n dl o wt a x( a f t e rt h ec o p y r i g h t / p a t e n t
expires) for the remaining life of the good. Hence, such a system of taxes
is intrinsically less distortionary than awarding private monopolies. Insofar
as the prize money is simply paid back to the innovator, this is essentially
the same as a system of mandatory licensing, in which the holder of the
private monopoly is required to sell at government mandated prices. Sys-
tems of mandatory licensing are widely used–in copyright, for example,
such things as radio play of music and photocopying of copyrighted mater-
ials are covered by mandatory licensing provisions. In the case of patent,
mandatory licensing was widely used in Taiwan until the Taiwanese were
forced to reform their patent system by the United States. So this kind of
mandatory licensing represents, as we might expect, the eﬃciency improve-
ment from replacing an unregulated monopoly with a regulated monopoly.
However, there is little reason that the proceeds of taxes on new goods
should be paid back to the innovator. From an eﬃciency perspective, it is
better that the proceeds be used to defray the costs of producing innova-
tions of high social value. This has several advantages over an intellectual
property system. First, to minimize the monopoly/tax distortion, the min-
imum necessary to get innovation should be paid. In particular, it is best
to pay h(ω), the indivisibility, to the innovator rather than the full social
value. The intellectual property system makes little use of social knowledge
of h(ω); with the exception of the nonobviousness requirement (now largely
defunct) of patent law, patents and copyright base reward on social value
rather than social cost. Second, as we noted above, if it is indeed the case
that social value is poorly correlated with private value (the strongest case
for increasing intellectual property protection as the scale of the market in-
creases) a system of rewards based on other information about social value
is likely to lead to a much better mix of innovations being produced. It
is important to note that, like mandatory licensing, systems of public (and
private) prizes have been widely used and are of demonstrated practicality.
The issue, also in the context of our model, boils down to the public
knowledge of the true social cost of introducing a new idea. When the latter
is known, a public subsidy to innovators equal to the amount h(ω), ﬁnanced
by a consumption tax and followed by unconstrained competition, is easily
shown to provide the least distortionary mechanism. When the information
about the true cost h(ω) of innovating is private the problem appears less
straightforward and worthy of further investigation.32
5.3. Positive Marginal Cost of Distributing Ideas. So far we have
assumed that there is no marginal cost of reproducing and distributing ideas
or goods that use ideas. There are several possible cases, depending on which
inputs are needed to do this. One possibility is that the same labor used
to create ideas is used to reproduce them. This case is rather complex,
because it introduces a third margin into the choice of φ–the monopoly for
inframarginal ideas, the marginal ideas, and the amount of labor used to
reproduce existing ideas.
In practice the type of labor used to reproduce ideas is probably not a
terribly good substitute for the labor used to produce the ideas themselves.
If we introduce an additional factor of production–unskilled labor, call it–
and assume that this is used to reproduce ideas, provided this factor is in
plentiful supply so that marginal cost is constant, little change is needed in
our analysis. In particular, instead of examining v(z,ω), we should examine
per capita utility net of the cost of reproducing the idea: v(z,ω)− mc(ω)z.
This may have an impact on whether quality is neutral, since it may be
neutral for v(z,ω), but not for v(z,ω) − mc(ω)z, but, for example, with
quadratic utility (linear demand) we have neutrality in both cases. In gen-
eral, we would expect this modiﬁcation to make it more likely that private
return and social value of an idea move together. This is because one intu-
itive reason social value increases with private return is that the marginal
cost of producing additional copies of an idea increases more slowly than
utility from the additional copies. As we have seen this reinforces our main
prediction, that IP protection should decrease when market size increases.
If the unskilled labor constraint binds before the skilled labor constraint
does–something we think is unlikely, but since the demand for unskilled
labor in this model grows much more rapidly than the demand for skilled
labor as λ increases, something we recognize is a possibility–then the mar-
ginal cost of producing copies increases as output of ideas increases. How-
ever, raising φ also does not generally result in an increase of the production
of new ideas, but rather raises the cost of producing copies of old ones, oﬀset-
ting the gain to the innovator from higher φ. Here the additional monopoly
proﬁts accrue to the scarce factor–unskilled labor. But the eﬀect is not
diﬀerent than if the constraint for skilled labor was binding–there is no
eﬃciency gain in creating a socially ineﬃcient monopoly merely in order to
increase the income of one group at the expense of another.
5.4. Consequences of Competitive Rents. As argued in Boldrin and
Levine [1999, 2002, 2004a,b] it is by no means true that in the absence
of any IP protection proﬁts for innovators are negligible or even zero. At
each moment of time, and especially shortly after innovation took place, a
capacity constraint is present that will give rise to nondistortionary compet-
itive rents. Most likely, there are also ﬁrst-mover advantages, such as those
documented by Tofuno [1989] in the market for ﬁnancial securities.33
We can model this by assuming a capacity constraint z(ω) on per capita
production after the IP protection expires. In this case, assuming the capa-
city constraint is not binding during the IP protection period, the innovator’s
total revenue from an idea ω is
φλzM(ω)vz(zM(ω),ω)+( 1− φ)λz(ω)vz(z(ω),ω).
Assuming the labor constraint does not bind, hence w =1 , dividing through
by h(ω), we can write the condition for good ω to be produced as
φλρ(ω)+( 1− φ)λρC(ω) ≥ 1,
where ρC(ω)=z(ω)vz(z(ω),ω)/h(ω) is the competitive rent per unit of
indivisibility cost. Let us use the simplifying assumption that competitive
rent is proportional to monopoly revenue, per unit of indivisibility cost; that
is, ρC(ω)=ϑρ(ω),w i t h0 <ϑ<1. Note that this is stronger than our earlier
neutrality assumptions, which had to hold only in expected value. Then we
can again write social welfare entirely in terms of ρ, and the only modiﬁcation
of our earlier expression for social welfare is that ρ =[ ( ϑ + φ(1 − ϑ))λ]−1.
The corresponding NOC is
NOC(λ,φ)=( 1− ϑ)
£
(1/(ϑ + φ(1 − ϑ)))
©
φνM +( 1− φ)νCª
− 1
¤
× Υ(1/(ϑ + φ(1 − ϑ))λ)
− (νC − νM),
from which we see that it continues to be true that if
Υ0(1/(ϑ + φ(1 − ϑ))λ) > 0,
then ˆ φ(λ) is unique and nondecreasing. In this case, we can also check that
NOCϑ < 0, so that higher competitive rents lead to a reduction in the
optimal level of protection.





Υ(1/ϑλ) − (νC − νM),
and as λ →∞this approaches −(νC − νM) < 0. Hence, when competitive
rents are present, the optimal level of protection should be set to zero at
a ﬁnite market size, not just asymptotically as in the extreme case of no
competitive rents.
5.5. Consequences of Rent-Seeking. Suppose that the size of the indi-
visibility does not vary systematically with private return. Then ideas with
high returns also have high absolute levels of proﬁt associated with them.
Suppose it is possible to purchase “extensions” of protection, in the form of
a ∆φ, from the government sector at a cost. Then it is owners of ideas with
high ρ that have the greatest incentive to do so, as they can “leverage” the
∆φ more than anyone else. This means that the marginal ﬁrms, who from
a social point of view are the reason for IP protection, do not get much say
over the length of protection. In the extreme case the marginal ﬁrms get no
protection, so the set of ideas produced is the same as without IP, and IP34
serves only to introduce a monopoly distortion. Rather remarkably, Landes
and Posner [2003] recommend embodying such a scheme in law.
6. International Trade and Harmonization
We now turn to the issue of IP protection in the world economy. Since it
is the empirically relevant case, we assume throughout this section that the
elasticity of total monopoly revenue is increasing. Our goal is to examine
whether optimal trade harmonization, meaning that all countries must set
the same level of IP, results in countries increasing or decreasing their level
of IP.21 It is tempting to view this as a typical tariﬀ-like free-riding problem:
countries try to free-ride oﬀ of each other’s innovation, and harmonization
enables them to agree on a more eﬃcient higher mutual level of protection.
But, because of the scale-of-market eﬀect, this need not be the case. We
ﬁnd that–in the empirically relevant case where only a small share of large
country patent revenue ﬂows to small countries–harmonization demands
that the large countries lower their level of protection. Basically there are
two eﬀects: one is that there is a tendency to underprotect because some
royalties are lost to overseas innovators. The second is the scale-of-market
eﬀect, which works in the opposite direction.22
Consider ﬁrst the simple case in which there are several countries and
no trade is possible. In this case opening the economies to trade in goods
and ideas results only in a scale-of-market eﬀect, and given our maintained
assumption that the elasticity of total monopoly revenue is increasing, by
our previous analysis the welfare optimum for the set of countries as a whole
is to reduce protection. The more demanding case is to consider a situation
in which there is already trade, but countries engage in non-cooperative
individually optimal IP policies before harmonization sets in.
We assume that there are I countries and that each country i has a ﬁxed
fraction θi of world demand and labor and a ﬁxed fraction  i of world ideas.
The total size of the world economy is still λ. We focus on the case in which
countries may not discriminate against foreign inventors. While de facto
violated in some occasions, this reﬂects current legal practices around the
world, and it allows us to focus on the speciﬁcr o l eo fI Pp r o t e c t i o n . W e
let φi denote the level of IP protection in country i. Our base assumptions
are that there is complete and costless free trade of goods, that the labor
21Grossman and Lai [2004] argue that harmonization necessarily results in all countries
increasing their level of IP. Due to an algebraic error, their argument is invalid except in
the constant elasticity case, as we explain below.
22Grossman and Lai [2004] correctly identify the ﬁrst eﬀect, but due to an algebraic
error, miss the second. In footnote 28 they compare the ﬁrst-order condition for a harmon-
ized welfare maximum to a best response in which the foreign country does not protect.
In this comparison they treat their parameter γ,w h i c hi st h es a m ea so u rΥ,a sh a v i n gt h e
same value in both equations. This is true only in the constant elasticity case, meaning for
their production function approach the production function must be Cobb-Douglas and
in our distributional approach the distribution must be Pareto.35
constraint does not bind, and that the elasticity of total monopoly revenue
is increasing.
From an inventor’s perspective, what is relevant is the eﬀective (weighted
by market shares) total protection received worldwide. This is simply φ = P
i φiθi,h e n c eρ =1 /φλ determines the marginal invention worldwide. Each













The ﬁrst component is the total utility that agents in country i receive
from their consumption of goods and leisure. The second is the proﬁts
accruing to the monopolists located in that country, which is the diﬀerence
between the revenue from worldwide sales and the cost of labor used to
innovate. The third is the total expenditure of consumers in country i for
their purchases of goods. To get per capita welfare, we normalize this by the
country population θiλ. In the case of a closed economy,  i =1and φi = φ,
so the proﬁt of the monopolists minus the consumers’ total expenditure is
simply equal to the cost of production, getting us back to the single country
social welfare function above.
The optimum of an individual country is calculated by diﬀerentiating the





φi(νM − 1) + (1 − φi)νC¤
Υ(1/φλ) − (νC − νM +1−  i).
Because the elasticity of total monopoly revenue is assumed increasing, this
is strictly concave in φi and continuous as a function of (φi,φ),s ot h eI P
protection game has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, characterized by the
ﬁrst-order conditions NOC(φi,φ)=0 .
The Symmetric Case. Consider ﬁrst a symmetric equilibrium of a sym-








+( 1− φ)νC¤ Υ(1/φλ)
Iφ
− (νC − νM +1− (1/I)) = 0.
Holding constant the total market size λ,l e tφ1 be the solution to the
single country problem from Section 3, and φIthe symmetric solution to36
the equation above. Because the ﬁrst term is positive and the second neg-
ative (I>1), and because the second term becomes more negative as I
increases, we have that NOC(φ1,φ 1) < 0, implying, since NOCIφ < 0 un-
der the elasticity condition, that φI <φ 1. More generally, φI is decreasing
in I and as the number of countries increases, the symmetric Nash equilib-
rium converges to the case of no IP, which is suboptimal in this setting. The
intuition behind this result is simple and ordinary: by decreasing φI ac o u n -
try loses because it creates fewer new goods and gains because it consumes
at the competitive level the goods created by the remaining I −1 countries.
As I increases the second margin strictly dominates the ﬁrst.
The NOC for the single country problem coincides with the social op-
timum for a global economy. Moreover, if each country is constrained to
set the same level of protection as all others, for example through a legal
mechanism such as the WTO, they would all agree to choose the social op-
timum φ1. This is the standard harmonization result: in the unconstrained
protection game countries underprotect due to the public goods nature of
IP protection, and a WTO-like mechanism that forces harmonization leads
them to the second best.
North versus South. Unfortunately, this analysis has little normative rel-
evance to policy analysis. Current extensions of IP are not between countries
of equal size with currently equal levels of IP. Rather, extension of IP pro-
tection is taking place between two very heterogeneous groups of countries.
The ﬁrst, consisting of North America, Europe, and Japan, has a relatively
large θi a n da ne v e nm u c hl a r g e r i, and has been harmonized for around
a century on a high level of IP protection. The second group consists of
developing countries with little or no IP protection. For purposes of calib-
ration, it is convenient to focus on the most signiﬁcant of these countries:
Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and Russia. The relevant facts about GDP in
these countries and their share of U.S. patents from Hall [2001] are shown
in Table 5.
Table 5
GDP Trillion USD %World GDP (θi) %US Patents (εi)
Brazil 1.13 2.59 0.07
China 4.50 10.32 0.86
India 2.20 5.05 0.11
Mexico 0.92 2.10 0.05
Russia 1.12 2.57 0.14
Total 9.87 22.63 1.23
World 43.60 100 100
For the purposes of our numerical exercise it makes sense to assume the
“North” controls about θ1 = .75 of world GDP and  1 = .987 of world ideas.
We will also focus on the case in which demand is linear, so νM =3 /2,νC =37
2, and in which total monopoly revenue M(ρ) is also linear–as this seems
best supported by the data.
Why There Is No IP in the South. First we show as a matter of theory
that, regardless of I, the equilibrium level of aggregate protection, φ,i s
bounded away from zero. There is one large country with shares θ1,  1
and I − 1 small countries with shares θi =( 1− θ1)/(I − 1) <θ 1,  i =











Observe that φ ≥ θ1φ1 and recall that NOC1(φ1,φ) is decreasing in φ.
Hence, NOC(φ1,θ1φ1) ≥ 0. Since this latter expression is also decreasing in
φ1,as o l u t i o nt oNOC(e φ1,θ 1e φ1)=0must satisfy φ1 ≥ e φ1 > 0. This in turn
implies that in equilibrium φ ≥ θ1e φ1 > 0.T h i s s h o w s t h a t φ is bounded
away from zero independent of k because the large country will never impose
a negligible amount of protection.

























which is strictly negative for I larger than
I∗ =
(νC − νM +1 )
(1 − θ1)
h




Since there is always a unique solution to NOCi(φi,φ)=0 ,f o rI>I ∗ it
occurs at φi =0 .





[(1/2)φi +( 1− φi)2]Υ(1/φλ) − ((3/2) −  i)=0 .
From our earlier analysis, we know that a plausible range for Υ is 0.15—0.40,
while for plausible interest rates the current U.S. patent term corresponds
to a φUS in the range 0.3—0.6. Assuming  i = θi and plugging in φi =0for






If we assume that the part of the world setting φ1 at least 0.3 consists of at
least two-thirds of the world economy–which is true of the G7 alone–then
φ is at least 0.2,w h i l eΥ ≤ 0.4. This gives a lower bound for the right-hand
side of 0.3, so any country with a smaller fraction of world GDP than this38
should not protect at all. Since none of the “Southern” countries control
near this fraction of world GDP, this lower bound is abundantly satisﬁed.
Note that if, contrary to our assumption,  i is smaller than θi,a si ti s ,t h e n
there is even less incentive for the South to choose a positive level of IP
protection in the current circumstances.
Should the North Increase or Decrease IP under Harmonization?
Consider ﬁrst the case in which  1 =1and θ1 < 1, that is, all ideas are
produced in the large country. In this case the solution for the large country
is the solution to the social optimum problem, which ignores supply from the
rest of the world and chooses φ1 to be optimal for a population of θ1λ<λ .
By the usual scale of market eﬀect, that means the equilibrium solution for
φ1 is larger than the value that maximizes world social welfare, that is, the
solution to the social optimum problem with population λ.
When some ideas are produced in the smaller country, that is,  1 < 1,
this eﬀect is weakened. This is because of the “proﬁt-stealing” eﬀect men-
tioned above. When the small countries are not protecting at all, the large
country has an incentive to set a lower level of protection than if it were
the only country in the world. The reason is that if it were the only coun-
try in the world, it would retain all the royalties from IP. However, if the
smaller countries also produce ideas, then part of the increased royalty pay-
ments is lost to overseas monopolists. Since in this case the large country
s e t sal o w e rl e v e lo fI Pt h a nw h e n 1 =1 , the proﬁt-stealing eﬀect tends to
oﬀset the scale-of-market eﬀect from increasing IP through harmonization
in the small countries. In the extreme case of constant elasticity of total
monopoly revenue–the Cobb-Douglas/Pareto case–the scale-of-market ef-
fect vanishes and only the proﬁt-stealing eﬀect is left, so that it is unam-
biguous that the large country should also increase IP with harmonization.
This is the case studied by Grossman and Lai [2004].
In our calibration, the NOC for a single aggregate large country is
[(1/φ1){(1/2)φ1 +( 1− φ1)2}]Υ(1/θ1φ1λ) = ((3/2) −  1),
while the NOC for the harmonized welfare maximum is
[(1/φ){(1/2)φ +(1− φ)2}]Υ(1/φλ)=1 /2.
We take θ1 = .75 throughout. Then the RHS of the single aggregate large
country NOC is 3−2 1 times the RHS for the harmonized welfare maximum.
On the other hand, if world protection under harmonization is the same as
the optimum for the single aggregate large country, that is, the optimal
φ = φ1, then the LHS of the single aggregate large country NOC is the
elasticity of Υ times 1/θ1.I nt h ec a s ei nw h i c hM(ρ) is linear, the elasticity
ρΥ0/Υ =1+Υ,s ot h eL H Si s(1 + Υ)/θ1. By the second-order condition,
it follows that it is optimal for the single large country to reduce protection
to reach the harmonized optimum if and only if (1 + Υ)/θ1 > 3 − 2 1.
Suppose ﬁrst that the “South” is just as eﬀective at producing ideas as
the “North” so that  i = θi = .75. In this case we see that the large country39
should reduce protection upon harmonization if Υ ≥ .33, which is near, but
still below, the upper range of our estimates of Υ.
However, the assumption that  i = θi is not nearly true. As Table 5
showed, the “South” controls on the order of 25% of world GDP, but gen-
erates well less than 2% of all U.S. patents. That is, the “proﬁt-stealing”
eﬀect is quite small, hence there is little reason for the “North” in the pre-
harmonization equilibrium to decrease its protection in order to decrease
the trivial revenue from patents it loses to the “South.” In our calibration,
we have taken  1 =0 .987. With this calibration 1/θ1 > 3 − 2 1 so that,
upon harmonization, the“North” should reduce protection regardless of the
elasticity Υ.
To estimate what the actual reduction of the Northern IP should be upon
harmonization in the calibrated version of our model, we compare the solu-
tion to the NOC for the single aggregate large country with that for the
harmonized welfare maximum, i.e., the two values of φ that solve our two
NOC above. Let φj be the optimum for the jth of the two NOCS, RHSj
be the RHS of the jth NOC, and Υj the elasticity of the jth NOC. Then










3+( 3− 2 1)/Υ1
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3Υ1 +( 1+Υ1)(φ/φ1θ1)
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2 +4( 3 Υ1 +( 3− 2 1))(1 + Υ1)/θ1
2(1+Υ1)/θ1
.
For Υ in the range 0.15—0.40 this implies φ/φ1 in the range 0.817 to 0.845. In
other words as part of TRIPs it would make sense to have about a 15—20%
r e d u c t i o ni nl e n g t ho fp a t e n tt e r m s ,f r o m ,s a y ,1 7y e a r st o1 4y e a r s .
Copyright. The astute reader will have noticed we have examined only
the harmonization of patents, and not that of copyrights. Current copyright
protection is eﬀectively inﬁnite while elasticities appear to be extremely low.
As we observed, this means that copyright protection is not consistent with
welfare maximization by the “North.” What this means is that the social
planner in the North is not setting current copyright levels to maximize social
welfare but, we conjecture, to maximize the rents accruing to the interest
groups that are covered by the copyright laws. Hence, while this means that
harmonization from optimal levels of protection might result in an increase40
in protection, current levels so greatly exceed the optimum that either with
or without harmonization they need to be drastically cut, and countries not
currently providing copyright protection would be foolish to agree to provide
such protection as part of a negotiated international agreement.
Other Considerations. Our base assumption is that countries cannot in-
crease the level of domestic innovation by changing their IP laws, as their
share of total innovation is ﬁxed at  i. Insofar as countries can increase their
share of worldwide innovative production by changing their national level of
IP protection, they beneﬁt from the fact that they increase their share of the
total monopoly proﬁts from innovation. In fact there is some evidence that
favorable IP treatment can attract innovation. There are several reasons
for this. First, favorable IP legislation may be a signal of favorable treat-
ment of innovators in general (for example, as in Ireland, through a generous
tax treatment of proﬁts from FDI). Second, although legal discrimination
against foreign inventors is forbidden in principle, there may be a variety of
informal reasons why it is advantageous to be a domestic innovator to take
advantage of strong local IP protection. Finally, the distribution of innova-
tion across countries can be driven by the explicit rent-seeking behavior of
innovators, who may choose to reward countries that provide favorable IP
protection with increased revenue from domestic innovation.
Insofar as increasing IP protection lures innovation, a second type of
equilibrium distortion arises. Rather than underprotecting in an eﬀort to
free ride oﬀ of innovation in other countries, the incentive is to overprotect
to try to get a disproportionate share of IP revenue.
7. Conclusion
7.1. Relation with Previous Literature. Besides the work of Grossman
and Lai [2002, 2004] there is a wide partial equilibrium literature on the op-
timal length of patent protection. This literature, stemming from the paper
of Gilbert and Shapiro [1990], examines the trade-oﬀ between patent length
and breadth for a single innovation. Gilbert and Shapiro give assumptions
under which optimal length is inﬁnite, while Gallini [1992] shows that with
a more realistic model of the “breadth” of protection, this result may be
reversed. This literature does not examine the broader question of optimal
policy that covers many diﬀerent ideas, and takes as given that policy can
easily determine “breadth” as well as “length.” We think that “breadth” is
much more diﬃcult to legislate than “length,” and because it is less visible,
more subject to rent-seeking, regardless of legislative intent. In our model,
unlike this literature, we eﬀectively take the “breadth” of protection as exo-
genous and focus on length. Insofar as “breadth” as well as “length” can be
legislated, our parameter φ c a nb er e g a r d e da sk i n do fas u m m a r yo fl e n g t h
and breadth combined. Hence, it would be good public policy to reduce
breadth as the scale of the market increases as well as length. In particular,
it might be a good idea to introduce the “independent invention” defense as41
suggested by Maurer and Scotchmer [2002], or to eliminate product patents
in favor of process patents only. However, it is clearly more practical to tie a
time limit to the growth of the economy than a particular scope of coverage.
A number of reasons, other than the invariance of the optimal length of
patents to the size of the market, have been invoked to justify policies asking
for an increase of the degree of IP protection as a consequence/condition
of trade liberalization. First, as Diwan and Rodrik [1991] argue, north-
ern and southern countries generally have diﬀerent technology needs and,
without the southern protection of IPRs, northern countries would not de-
velop technologies largely needed by the South. This seems rather at odds
with both basic principles and historical facts. Developing countries have
developed, almost always and invariably, by adopting technologies that had
been developed by the advanced ones. Indeed, the very same notion of
“convergence” would make no sense if this were not the case. Examples of
countries that have developed late by inventing technologies substantially
diﬀerent from those invented by the already developed ones are conspicu-
ously absent. China and India are currently achieving unusually high growth
rates by adopting exactly the same technologies adopted earlier by developed
countries; this is currently called “outsourcing,” and it means just that. So
much for history and facts. But even in an abstract and purely theoretical
sense, the Diwan and Rodrik story can make sense if and only if one argues
that poor countries have natural and unmodiﬁable resources and skills that
are completely diﬀerent and orthogonal to those that richer countries had
when they were at the same stage of development. Further, one needs to
also assume, or show, that the technologies adopted by advanced countries
can neither be learned nor transported to the poorer ones, or that doing so
is more costly than developing completely new, and as of now yet unknown,
technologies. Both claims sound implausible. All historical evidence, includ-
ing the development of the United States in the nineteenth century, shows
that “convergence” or “catching-up” takes place only when the followers
imitate the technologies of the leaders. Hence, facilitating technological im-
itation (call it “pirating” if you like) is the key to economic development for
newcomers. No imitation, no (development) party.
A second line of thought argues that northern ﬁrms may react to the
lack of IPRs in the South by making their technologies more diﬃcult to
imitate, which can result in less eﬃcient research technologies and fewer
northern innovations (Taylor, [1993, 1994]; Yang and Maskus [2001]). This
is possible in theory; facts seem to contradict it, though. In theory, the
opposite eﬀect is also possible: the more the South imitates the North, the
more the Northern ﬁrms innovate to preserve the value of their immobile
factors. In this case, lack of IP protection in the South fosters higher rates of
innovation in the North. Historically, IP protection in the underdeveloped
countries was weaker in the nineteenth century than now, and this did not
seem to lead ﬁrms in Europe to invest heavily in secrecy or innovate less. If
secrecy was so high when, say, the United Kingdom was the leading country42
and most of economically backward Europe had no IP protection laws, how
did those European countries ever manage to imitate and adopt the British
technologies? The same, rhetorical, question could be asked for Japan, South
Korea, and a long list of countries that developed during the last 50 years.
Third, some commentators on intellectual property, such as Landes and
Posner [2003], have become confused on the point of optimal length of in-
tellectual property protection, arguing for a system of perpetual copyright
renewal that would have little eﬀect in increasing the incentive to innova-
tion, while perpetuating the monopoly losses on inframarginal productions.
There is no sense in which such informal arguments, often developed by con-
fusing “pecuniary” with “real” externalities, can be derived from a general
equilibrium theory of optimal IP protection.
Finally, it should be noted that the theory proposed here does not say
that the South should have systematically less IP protection than the North
but, instead, that both should have a common IP protection at a level
substantially lower than it is currently in the North, e.g., the United States
and the European Union.
7.2. Shortcomings and Future Research. The most important missing
aspect of our analysis is the dynamic feature that ideas build on other ideas.
As pointed out in Scotchmer [1991] and Boldrin and Levine [1999, 2004a, b],
ideas that use other ideas as inputs greatly weaken the case for IP because
the latter, while it encourages innovations by improving the return to the
ﬁrst inventor, discourages further innovations through raising their cost. In
this sense, there is no reason to think that adding true dynamic features to
the model is likely to make IP more socially desirable. In fact, when the
complexity of innovations increases because new ones need to use more and
more old ideas as inputs, the presence of widespread IP naturally determines
a holdup problem where even one residual monopolist can prevent new ideas
from being implemented. (See Boldrin and Levine [2004b] for a simple formal
version of this argument.)
As we observed, neither that the number of ideas can increase with size at
diﬀerent rates for diﬀerent characteristics nor that the indivisibility varies
with the size of the economy is a possibility considered here. These are
valuable, but theoretically demanding, extensions for various reasons. The
ﬁrst extension is valuable because new ideas are not all equally useful; hence,
the fact that market size can make ideas with certain characteristics more
abundant than others is relevant for welfare. The relevance comes from the
fact that ideas with high private returns need not be ideas with high social
values, and vice versa; an optimal innovation policy should be designed
by taking this eﬀect into account. This is a hard problem to tackle on
purely theoretical grounds, and, unfortunately, we are aware of no empirical
research measuring the relationship between private return and social value
of new ideas.43
The second extension, allowing for variations in the indivisibility h(ω)
that are due to variations in market size, is also interesting. In theory, one
can argue that a larger economy implies more competition to develop ideas
potentially already available, and few additional potential ideas; that is,
h(ω,λ) increases with λ while g(λ) is practically ﬂat. The opposite case is,
clearly, also a theoretical possibility. Which of the two is empirically relevant
would be important to provide guidance to theoretical research. To discrim-
i n a t eb e t w e e nt h et w op o l a rh y p o t h e s e so n en e e d st ob ea b l et om e a s u r et h e
portion of h(ω) that is wasted when one does not win the innovation race,
versus the complementary portion that may be used to come up with further
and diﬀerent innovations. That is, how much do past, even unsuccessful, re-
search eﬀorts contribute to future successes? Anecdotal evidence is mixed,
and serious empirical work is completely missing. Similarly, the function
g(λ) also needs to be measured. Are we all drawing from the same Platonic
urn of ideas? Does schooling allow us, at least, to sample without replace-
ment, so that more people means faster drawing of new ideas? Or are we,
instead, sampling from the same urn with replacement, in which case more
and more useless duplicates are drawn as λ increases? Or, maybe, adding
more people increases the number of original ideas in the urn from which
we sample, making g(λ) increase quite fast? These are important empirical
and theoretical questions that current research has not yet considered.
Turning to the policy implications of our results: if φλ is held ﬁxed,
the quality of ideas produced remains unchanged. This is not the social
optimum: generally we will want to take advantage of the increased λ to
allow some marginal ideas to enter the market. A simple rule of thumb is
to observe that for large λ a linear M(ρ) implies that protection should be
reduced by about half the increase in scale of market. Thus, the simple
rule of thumb would be that if the size of market doubles, the amount of
protection should be reduced by about 1/3–that is, a 50% increase in 2/3
the level of protection is half of the 100% increase in the size of the market.
Taking a real interest rate of 2% per year, observe that 1−φ = e−rT, where T
i st h el e n g t ho fI Pp r o t e c t i o n .U s i n glog(1+x) ≈ x,t h i sg i v e s∆T ≈ 50∆φ.
For example, the G7 nations account for about 2/3rds of world GDP.
If we think of the intellectual property changes in the WTO as extending
the protection that exists in the G7 nations to the rest of the world, this
suggests a reduction in protection by about 1/6. This means approximately
an 8-year reduction in term. Similarly, if the world economy is growing at
2 %ay e a r ,as i m p l er u l eo ft h u m bw o u l db et or e d u c ep r o t e c t i o nt e r m sb y
1% per year, or about 6 months per year.
A paradigmatic case is that of popular music. Forty years ago, at the
time of Elvis Presley and the Beatles, new recordings selling a million units
were considered exceptional successes and awarded “gold records,” while in
the current times a successful record sells easily 10 to 20 million copies. The
eﬀective size of the market has, therefore, increased by at least a factor of
ten. At the same time, advances in recording and digital technologies have44
reduced the ﬁxed cost required to produce a new record to about one-ﬁfth of
its earlier level. This suggests that the socially optimal length of copyright
protection should have dropped by about a factor of 25. Unfortunately, in
the case of copyright, terms have been moving in the opposite direction;
copyright terms have grown by a factor of about four since early in the
twentieth century. This means that, at least for recorded music, they cur-
r e n t l ya r eo nt h eo r d e ro f1 0 0t i m e sl o n g e rt h a nt h e ys h o u l db e .As i m i l a r
calculation can be performed for books and movies. Consider the fact that,
since the beginning of the past century, world GDP has grown by nearly
two orders of magnitude. It is reasonable to argue that the size of the mar-
ket for books and movies must have grown by at least as much, as literacy
has surged and the availability of playing devices has increased more than
proportionally due to the dramatic drop in their relative prices. Hence, if
the copyright term of 28 years at the beginning of the twentieth century
was socially optimal, the current term should be about 6 months, rather
than the current term of approximately 100 years. This gives a ratio of 200
between the actual copyright terms and their socially optimal value.
Our results are relevant for the debate on the impact of IP harmonization
policies on developing countries. Romer [1994], among others, has pointed
o u tt h a ti nt h ep r e s e n c eo fﬁxed costs the welfare loss from tariﬀ protection
may be orders of magnitude larger than the usual Harberger’s triangle. The
same logic applies to the welfare losses due to IP protection. The point to
notice here is that monopoly prices due to patents and copyright have the
same eﬀect as taxes on ex post proﬁts and lead to the noncreation of a new
good or the nonadoption of a new production process when the indivisibility
is relevant.
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Appendix: Data
Book Revenue. We collected all the titles, ISBNs, and sale prices listed
at www.amazon.com for the query hardcover ﬁction books and for the two
publication periods of September 2003 and September 2004. The sales data
are from the Ingram stock statistics, automatic telephone line at 615-213-
6803. The Ingram stock statistics system gives the following statistics for
each ISBN punched in: “total sales this year,” “total sales last year,” “total
current unadjusted demand,” “total last week demand.” Total revenue for
each book is calculated using the total sales data from Ingram and the
November 2004 sales price listed at www.amazon.com. Ingram is a large
book distributor, and is generally thought to generate roughly 1/6 of all
book sales. It should be noted that the sales prices at www.amazon.com are
changing over time, most often decreasing, so we might have underestimated
the revenue during the ﬁrst year for books published during September 2003.
Because of the large number of observations, we do not reproduce the data
here, but they are available at http://www.dklevine.com/data.htm.
Copyright Time Series. The basic source of the copyright registration
time series is the annual report of the Copyright Oﬃce from 2000, which can
be found at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/annual/2000/appendices.pdf.
This also includes the breakdown of registrations by type for 2000. Popula-
tion data for 1901—99 are from the U.S. Census Bureau at http://www.census.
gov/population/estimates/nation/popclockest.txt. Data prior to 1901 are
from http://www.census.gov/population/censusdata/table-2.pdf. The two
sources have a slight discrepancy for 1900 population with the former source
reporting 76,094,000 and the latter (which we used) 76,212,168. The year
2000 data are from the 2000 census. Literacy rates are from http://www.
arthurhu.com/index/literacy.htm. The data we used can be found at http://
www.dklevine.com/data.htm.47
Patent Time Series. R&D Expenditures by Sectors: National Patterns
of R&D Resources: 2002 Data Update, Table D, National Science Founda-
tion. GDP.: National Income and Production Account, Table 1.1.5, Bureau
of Economic Analysis. Population: 1953—1959: Population Estimates Pro-
gram, Population Division, U.S. Census Bureau, release date: April 2000.
1960—2002: U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of United States, 2004—
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